

spectaculars' without making specific demands is a worrying break from Clausewitzian tradition (see Chapters 27 and 30 this volume).

Finally, when confronted by 'revolutionary' wars, which cry out for counter-revolutionary responses, Clausewitz's injunction to destroy the military forces of the adversary is problematic not just because such 'military forces' are often indistinguishable from the local populace but also because one can never be sure they have been eliminated 'unless one is ready to destroy a large portion of the population' (Rapoport 1968: 53, see also Chapter 31 this volume). The problem, as Rapoport noted, is that 'this usually conflicts with the political aim of the war' – to insure the irrelevance of the revolutionary ideology in question – 'and hence also violates a fundamental Clausewitzian principle'.

As we have seen, different philosophies understand war in different ways. But in the traditionally Anglo-American-dominated field of security studies the political philosophy has held sway (on the ethnocentric tendencies of security studies see Booth 1979, Barkawi and Laffey 2006). All that can be said in general terms is that whatever approach to understanding warfare one adopts will have consequences, opening up some avenues and closing down others. In International Relations and security studies warfare has commonly been defined in ways that highlight its cultural, legal and political dimensions but more attention should probably be given to the sociology of war (see Box 13.2).

### The functions of war

Scholars in IR and security studies have usually focused on investigating the causes of war and tracing their incidence over time/place or analysing how the threat and use of military force might be used to coerce or deter opponents. But warfare is not just an instrument of policy or an entirely negative phenomenon with 'causes' and 'effects'; it also has functions. As David Keen (2008) has pointed out, significant sectors of society may benefit from war. Thus to understand why wars are started and why they persist, analysts need to understand what these benefits are and to examine wars as positive phenomena that have functions as well as causes and effects.

For Keen, the conventional wisdom is that the point of engaging in warfare is to win a violent contest against one's opponent, sooner rather than later. But based on his analysis of a variety of recent wars including those in Sudan, Sierra Leone, Chechnya, Colombia, and Afghanistan, Keen observed a variety of practices that showed the participants in warfare were not always primarily interested in victory. Rather, war served a variety of other functions.

A first central aim of war beyond victory was to *limit violence*, especially one's own exposure or that of a key political constituency. This could be achieved in a variety of ways. Geographically, efforts could be made to fight away from one's own homeland. Politically, one could 'farm out' violence and its adverse consequences to militias or proxies. This would be particularly important if the recruitment of a large, conscript army would be unpopular.

### BOX 13.2 DEFINING WAR: CULTURAL, LEGAL, POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACHES

**Cultural:** Warfare looks different and conjures up different meanings depending where and when in human history the analyst looks. As John Keegan has suggested, war 'is always an expression of culture, often a determinant of cultural forms, in some societies the culture itself' (1994: 12). In this sense, war is best understood as a socially constructed category, but one with powerful material implications like marriage, the market, or society. This means that what 'we' choose to define as an act of war may not always coincide with how 'others' see things.

**Legal:** Another approach is to define war in juridical terms, for example, as 'the legal condition which equally permits two or more hostile groups to carry on a conflict by armed force' (Wright 1983: 7). From this perspective war is distinguished from peace because it is a state of legal contestation through military means. However, this does not mean that war is synonymous with the conduct of military engagements: parties can be legally in a state of war without overt violence occurring between them. The relationship between North and South Korea following the cessation of hostilities in 1953 would be one such instance. However, because the international legal framework is primarily defined by states, analysing war through solely legal lenses has limited applicability in cases of armed conflict where either the belligerents are not states or where the government of a particular state is loath to recognize the actions of its domestic opponents as constituting warfare rather than criminal activity.

**Political:** Arguably the most popular approach within security studies has been to define war, following Clausewitz, as a particular type of political activity involving violence. Hedley Bull, for instance, defines war as:

organised violence carried on by political units against each other. Violence is not war unless it is carried out in the name of a political unit; what distinguishes killing in war from murder is its vicarious and official character, the symbolic responsibility of the unit whose agent is the killer. Equally, violence carried out in the name of a political unit is not war unless it is directed against another political unit; the violence employed by the state in the execution of criminals or the suppression of pirates does not qualify because it is directed against individuals.

(Bull 1977: 178)

**Sociological:** War is understood as a socially generative form of relations, that is, warfare 'consumes and reworks social and political orders'. It is a 'full spectrum' social phenomenon inasmuch as it involves 'the complete range of social, cultural, economic and political relations, shaping everything from matters of state to gender relations, from high politics to popular culture' (Barkawi 2011: 713). Combat and strategy are often among the most visible aspects of warfare as a social force but they represent only a small part of its sociology.

entailed a period of post-war occupation.' Fourth, the study noted war's increasingly global scope, as more and more states across the world's continents were drawn into conflicts originating in European politics.

Finally, these tendencies combined to blur the distinction between the civilian and military spheres; a key characteristic of 'total wars'. This had several effects, not least the fact that as ordinary citizens back home became more deeply involved in fuelling the war effort, it was not long before they became the targets of deliberate and large-scale violence. During the Second World War, for example, large-scale atrocities were committed by the Japanese military against Chinese civilians, on the Eastern Front in fighting between the Germans and Soviets, and with the atomic bombs and carpet bombing meted out upon Japanese cities. The temptation to target civilians was facilitated by advances in military technology which ultimately made possible the strategic bombing of cities such as Dresden, Coventry and Osaka during that war. As a result, the Second World War became the first conflict since Europe's Thirty Years' War where civilian deaths outnumbered military deaths (Imlay 2007: 556). In recent years Western states have attempted to re-solidify the distinction between civilian and military spheres (discussed below).

While the idea of total war has been a pervasive feature of the literature analysing warfare it is arguably a confusing and often unhelpful concept. Since real wars can never be 'total,' debating how closely they approximate this ideal – which wars were more total than others? – makes little grammatical sense; something is total or it is not. Hence this mode of thinking can obscure more than it clarifies. Instead, a more useful approach to studying real wars is to analyse the varying degrees of 'intensity' of warfare across various indicators such as the efforts/resources expended and the costs/losses incurred during war (Imlay 2007: 566–7).

### The 'new wars' debate

A second way of thinking about how warfare might be changing involves the argument that, especially since 1945, globalization has given rise to a distinctive form of violent conflict commonly labelled 'new wars' (Kaldor 1997, 1999, 2007b, Munkler 2004, Box 13.4). According to Kaldor (1999), in new wars the traditional distinctions between war (violence between states or organized political groups for political motives), organized crime (violence by private associations, usually for financial gain), and large-scale violations of human rights (violence by states or private groups against individuals, mainly civilians) has become increasingly blurred.

These new wars are distinct from 'old wars' in terms of their goals, methods and systems of finance, all of which reflect the ongoing erosion of the state's monopoly of legitimate organized violence (Kaldor 1999). The goals of combatants can be understood in the context of a struggle between cosmopolitan and exclusivist identity groups. The latter are understood to be seeking control of a particular territory by ethnically cleansing everybody of a different identity group or those people who espouse cosmopolitan political

opinions. In terms of methods, Kaldor suggests new wars are fought through a novel 'mode of warfare' that draws on both guerrilla techniques and counterinsurgency. Yet this mode of warfare is distinctive inasmuch as decisive engagements are avoided and territory is controlled through political manipulation of a population by sowing 'fear and hatred' rather than winning 'hearts and minds'. It is thus not surprising that paramilitaries and groups of hired thugs are a common feature of these war zones as they can spread fear and hatred among the civilian population more effectively than professional armed forces (see Mueller 2000). This perspective might help explain the rise in one-sided massacres of civilians identified above. Bands of paramilitary forces are also useful because it can be difficult to trace back responsibility for their actions to political leaders. The final characteristic of Kaldor's new wars is that they are financed through a globalized war economy that is decentralized, increasingly transnational and in which the fighting units are often self-funding through plunder, the black-market or external assistance (see also Duffield 2001: ch. 6).

Wars that reflect these characteristics are often very difficult to bring to a decisive end. As a result, Kaldor suggests that the resolution of these new wars lies with the reconstruction of legitimate (that is cosmopolitan) political communities that instil trust in public authorities, restore their control of organized violence, and re-establish the rule of law. In this context, the role of concerned outsiders should be to provide what she calls 'cosmopolitan law enforcement' in the form of robust peace operations involving a combination of military, police and civilian personnel.

### BOX 13.4 COMMON HYPOTHESES IN THE 'NEW WARS' LITERATURE

*Hypothesis 1:* An essential characteristic of 'new wars' is the progressive erosion of the state's monopoly on the use of force. Consequently, traditional distinctions between combatants and civilians become increasingly blurred.

*Hypothesis 2:* 'New wars' are driven by economic aspirations with political or ideological motivations playing only a minor role. This political economy of 'new wars' reinforces and perpetuates the violence.

*Hypothesis 3:* 'New wars' are characterized by asymmetry involving the constellation of (a) actors, (b) military capabilities, (c) the methods of warfare and (d) the politics of war.

*Hypothesis 4:* 'New wars' are driven by exclusive conceptions of identity, which are instrumentalized for the purpose of seizing political power. These forms of 'identity politics' are unfolding in the context of the erosion of state structures and the insecurities of globalization.

*Hypothesis 5:* The new forms of international terrorism represent a modern variant of guerrilla warfare but unlike traditional guerrilla warfare, this new kind of terrorism poses a strategic challenge to Western societies.

(Source: Mello 2010)




Figure 13.3 Sources of war deaths (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005: 149)

category of war deaths, this type is arguably the least well documented and understood (see Figure 13.3). This is because measuring 'indirect deaths' is fraught with problems, not least those concerning methodology (especially how to measure and compare 'normal' as opposed to 'abnormal' mortality rates), data-collection, and because publicized estimates are commonly inflated or deflated for reasons of propaganda. Nevertheless, there is a large degree of consensus that the changing demography of victims is linked to changes in the mode of contemporary warfare.

### Is the nature of warfare changing?

Debates about whether and how the nature of warfare is changing are as old as the concept itself. In recent years, however, debates about three questions have been particularly important in addressing this issue: whether the concept of 'total war' is useful for thinking about developments in warfare; whether the processes of globalization have given rise to a 'new' type of warfare; and whether advanced industrialized democracies in the West are waging a new type of war compared to earlier historical periods.

#### The idea of total war

Although the term 'total war' was coined by the German First Quartermaster General, Erich Ludendorff, in 1918, fear of such a prospect had dominated Western views of warfare since at least 1800. The fears were exemplified by the horrors of the First and Second World Wars which killed approximately 8.5 million and 55 million people respectively (see Bourne 2005, Overy 2005). Although few contemporary wars come close to matching the scale and intensity of these conflicts, the longevity of the idea of total war is evident

Table 3.1 Realist and liberal security systems

<i>Theoretical base</i>	Realist (Alliance)	Liberal (Community of Law)
<i>Structure of the international system</i>	Material; Static; Anarchic; Self-help system	Social; Dynamic; Governance without government
<i>Conceptions of security:</i> <i>Basic principles</i> <i>Strategies</i>	Accumulation of power Military deterrence Control of allies	Integration Democratization Conflict resolution Rule of Law
<i>Institutional features:</i> <i>Functional scope</i> <i>Criterion for membership</i> <i>Internal power structure</i>	Military realm only Strategic relevance Reflects distribution of power; most likely hegemonic	Multiple issue areas Democratic system of rule Symmetrical; high degree of interdependence
<i>Decision-making</i>	Will of dominant powers prevails	Democratically legitimized
<i>Relation of system to its environment</i>	Dissociated; perception of threat	Serves as an attractive model; open for association.

perspective. The key difference is the response to the threat. In a liberal community of law, potential disturbances are not dealt with by mobilizing superior power but rather diffused through integration, by reinsurance and by conflict resolution. Threats are circumvented by common membership in a security institution.

### Conclusion

In liberal International Relations theory, the state is not an actor but an institution 'constantly subject to capture and recapture, even construction and reconstruction' by coalitions of social actors (Moravcsik 2001: 5). The theory has distinct variants which supply different motivations for action and which have different implications for security theory. In ideational liberalism, the underlying motive is social identity and conflict will ensue if borders do not accord with social identity. Conflict will also ensue across social identities. In commercial liberalism, the underlying motivation is economic benefit, which does not necessarily lead to cooperation, but which identifies under what sorts of circumstances the economy can be a peace-producer. In republican liberalism, the critical factor is state form and states can be integrated into long-term peace arrangements which at the same time encourage democratization and internal state reform. The contribution of these variants of liberalism to security theory is dense, specified and progressive.

Table 28.1 The variety of arrangements for allocating violence

Financing for security services				
National financing	Foreign national financing	Multinational financing	Private financing (for profit)	Private financing (not for profit)
National delivery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>USA in WWI</li> <li>German troops in the American Revolution</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>German troops in the American Revolution</li> <li>The first Gulf War</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Shell financing Nigerian Forces</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WWF financing park guards in DRC</li> </ul>
Foreign national delivery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>German troops in the American Revolution</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Korean troops fighting for the USA in Vietnam</li> <li>The first Gulf War</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Branch group contributing to Nigerian forces in Sierra Leone</li> </ul>	
Multinational delivery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NATO in Kosovo</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Muslim states' contribution to Western military aid in Bosnia</li> <li>UN Peacekeeping</li> </ul>		
Private delivery (for profit)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>MPPRI's provision of ROTC Trainees to the USA</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>MPPRI's work for Croatia</li> <li>MPPRI's work for Bosnia</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>DSL working for Lonhro in Mozambique</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>DSL working for ICRC around the world</li> </ul>
Private delivery (not for profit)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Green Cross</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>BP financing Colombian paramilitaries</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Wildaid in Asia</li> </ul>

Source: Avant 2005: 25

Military forces are the norm, the last century has provided cases that fit in almost every box. The not-for-profit financing column is the most problematic, conceptually, as it encompasses a range of possibilities from NGOs to rebel paramilitary, and militia forces. It is also, however, one of the more important columns. During the post-Cold War era, private (for and not-for) profit financing and delivery have been significant areas of growth.

The current market compared

This is not the first market for force. Markets for allocating violence were common before the systems of states came to dominate world politics. Feudal lords supplemented their forces with contracted labour from the beginning of the twelfth century, and from the end of the thirteenth century, through the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, virtually all force was allocated through the market. Furthermore, the rise of the state did not immediately preclude the market allocation of violence. Early modern states both delegated control over force to commercial entities and participated in the market as both suppliers and purchasers.

Chartered companies, prominent in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, such as the British East India Company, were an instance of state-delegated commercial control over violence. Chartered companies were state-designated entities for engaging in long distance trade and establishing colonies. The Dutch, English, French, and Portuguese all chartered companies during this time. French companies were state enterprises forged by the king and designed to increase state power later in the game. Dutch companies were private wealth-seeking enterprises that were organized in a charter so as to enhance the Dutch profit relative to the English or (particularly) the Portuguese. The crown chartered the English companies for similar reasons. These forces were both an army and a police force for establishing order and then protecting both trade routes and new territory. Also during the early period of the state, states rented out their forces to other friendly states. These troops would arrive equipped and ready to fight under the command of the contracting government.

Even in the modern system, some states have relied on the private sector, for weapons particularly, but also for logistics support, and for a variety of services idiosyncratic to a particular conflict. The US government, for instance, has a long history of looking to the market for military services. Up until the beginning of World War II, most of these services were in the area of logistics support and weapons procurement. During the Cold War, however, the US hired firms to perform military training missions as well. The British government hired less frequently than the US from the market for military services in the modern period, but allowed its citizens to sell their services abroad. The commercial sale of security services by British citizens abroad can be traced back through the centuries (Thomson 1994: 22). More recently UK Special Air Services (SAS) personnel formed firms to sell military and security