

than the estimated total gross national product itself if we grow at the rate of four per cent a year during the coming decade. In fact it will require a net growth rate of economy as it is now organized. These facts make all the more absurd the claims of the Ad Hoc Committee that technology is making manpower redundant. With so many needs to be filled, we must have a rise in productivity that will require not only increased automation but the full employment of the entire labor force. Meanwhile, the specters of automation can only distract us from the really difficult political and economic problems that lie ahead.

Annotated Bibliography

Recent Books on Automation

Manpower Report of the President
1965 (U.S. Government Printing Office, \$1.75)

This is the third of the annual reports now required by Congress. The three reports together provide a comprehensive picture of the manpower resources of the country. The 1963 report is still the most useful, in that it supplies basic data on productivity and future manpower needs. The 1965 report concentrates on retraining and development.

Unemployment in the United States

by Robert M. Solow.

(Almqvist & Wiksell, Stockholm)

A 51-page essay which is the most meticulous analysis of the "structuralist" hypothesis about unemployment that I know of.

Men Without Work: The Economics of Unemployment

edited by Stanley Lebergott.

(Prentice-Hall, 1964, paper \$1.95, cloth \$4.95)

An excellent compendium that brings together the conflicting views on the automation issue, plus material on characteristics of the unemployed, and training programs here and abroad.

Automation and Technological Change
edited by John T. Dunlop.

(Prentice-Hall, 1962, paper \$1.95, cloth \$3.95)

An American Assembly volume which usefully parallels the Lebergott collection in concentrating on the consequences of automation for businesses, for collective bargaining, and for changes in society.

The New Improved American

by Bernard Asbell.

(McGraw-Hill, 1965, \$5)

Hailing the potential of automation, Asbell argues that coming changes will require a complete overhaul of our educational system. His descriptions of the inadequacy of American education are telling, and his proposals for necessary reforms are provocative. Yet as Asbell asserts, it is doubtful whether the reasons for such reforms lie in the needs of the new technology.

Beyond Automation: Managerial Problems of an Exploding Technology

by John Diebold.

(McGraw-Hill, \$7.50)

A hortatory volume, collecting Mr. Diebold's legislative statements and public addresses over the past several years; with such statements (under the heading of "A Program for Action") as: "The State of New York should conduct and sponsor detailed studies of the human and economic consequences of automation within the state," 216 overblown pages for \$7.50? A disgrace.

The Automation Hysteria

by George Terborgh.

(Machinery and Allied Products Institute, \$4)

Despite the flamboyant title and somewhat strident tone, this book by an economist who, a generation ago, challenged the Alvin Hansen thesis of economic stagnation, is a useful compilation of evidence on the economic effects of automation so far. By concentrating however on refuting the "alarmists" one is left with the bewildering sense that automation presents no problem at all.

The Next Generation

by Donald N. Michael.

(Random House, \$4.95)

An effort to identify the kinds of social changes and problems which the country may face in the next twenty years, the

Bureaucracy and Its Clientele—A Case Study

ELIHU KATZ

S. N. EISENSTADT

Theory and Research on Bureaucratization

In the broadest sense, the theoretical problem here deals with the conditions affecting the degree of bureaucratization of an organization, specifically of the bureaucrat-client relationship. We are interested in the factors that make for varying degrees of bureaucratization as well as the factors (presumably the same ones) that influence the direction of organizational change. Indeed, in the writings of Max Weber and Robert Michels the problem of organizational change is essentially identical with the theme of bureaucratization.¹ If

Elihu Katz and S. N. Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy and its Clientele—A Case Study," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 5, 253-271, with minor omissions.

¹ Max Weber, "The Presuppositions and Causes of Bureaucracy," in Robert K. Merton, Ailsa P. Gray, Barbara Hockey, and Hanan Selvin, eds., *Reader in Bureaucracy* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1952), pp. 60-68. Of course, Weber was also concerned with the role of internal factors making for a greater degree of bureaucratization in the organization, a notable example being his discussion of "The Routinization of Charisma," which tends to develop when a group faces the problem of leadership succession, *ibid.*, pp. 92-100. This also gives a brief statement of Robert Michels' argument (*ibid.*, pp. 88-92), as does his *Political Parties* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1949).

book suffers from a skimpiness (e.g., twelve significant technological areas are covered in twenty pages) which reduces its use for any serious student of the problem.

the classical sociological writings were concerned with bureaucratization, the later writings have devoted themselves to the problems of overbureaucratization. Thus, discussions of deviations from the ideal-type bureaucracy outlined by Weber focused on overbureaucratization as a threat to the attainment of the very goals for which the organizations were established. The leading character in these discussions, the official who converts means into ends, has been frequently described both in literary and scientific publications. The same is true for the accompanying manifestations of exaggerated hierarchy and red tape.²

Recently, however, with the beginning of empirical research on organizational behavior, these assumptions about the unidirectional evolution of organizations have been put into broader perspectives. Thus, recent empirical research seems to suggest that (1) the trend toward total bureaucratization of organizations may sometimes be averted;³ (2) actual bureau-

² The best known of these essays is probably Robert K. Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality," in Merton, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 361-71.

³ Seymour M. Lipset, Martin A. Trow, and James S. Coleman, *Union Democracy* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1956), try to specify the conditions that contribute, in at least one case, to the maintenance of trade-union democracy rather than oligarchic bureaucracy.

cracies are compounded of nonbureaucratic elements also;⁴ (3) bureaucracies, once established, are by no means unchanging,⁵ and (4) when changes do take place, they are not always in the direction of greater bureaucratization and formalism.⁶

Factors Affecting Bureaucratization in the Official-Client Relationship

The literature provides a number of suggestions concerning the factors affecting bureaucratization in general. Weber's emphasis has already been noted.⁷ Succession is another familiar example. When a new director takes

⁴ This, of course, refers to the dominant trend of present-day research, which has been concerned with the existence and the functions of informal social relations in the context of formal organization. But more important for our present purpose is the incipient concern for informal aspects of relationships between bureaucrats and the public. See, for example, Morris Janowitz, Deil Wright, and William Delaney, *Public Administration and the Public* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan Press, 1958); Edwin J. Thomas, "Role Conceptions and Organizational Size," *American Sociological Review*, 24 (1959), 30-37; George F. Lombard, *Behavior in a Selling Group* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955). For a recent critique of the assumption that the several elements of Weber's ideal-type bureaucracy are necessarily intercorrelated, see Stanley H. Udy, Jr., "'Bureaucracy' and 'Rationality' in Weber's Organization Theory," *American Sociological Review*, 24 (1959), 792-95.

⁵ See Peter M. Blau, *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy* (Chicago: Chicago University Press), especially Chapter III.

⁶ See Ralph H. Turner, "The Navy Disbursing Officer as a Bureaucrat," in Merton, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 372-79. Also compare Blau, *loc. cit.*, for an example of the way in which variations in supervisory practice affected the extent to which employment agency officials used racial bias vis-à-vis their clients.

⁷ Max Weber, "The Presuppositions and Causes of Bureaucracy," in Merton, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-68.

over from a predecessor, he has little choice but to insist on relatively greater formal relations, to demand adherence to the appointed channels of communication, and the like.⁸ Another factor is monopolization. When an organization has a monopoly on certain goods or services (as most public bureaucracies have, of course), there is little chance of effective protest on the part of the client and no possibility of recourse to a competitor; under such conditions, bureaucrats may permit themselves an attitude of detachment and ritualistic formalism vis-à-vis their clients.⁹

The reverse of each of these influences should be associated with a lesser degree of bureaucratization. Thus, a smaller organization or one which suffers a reduction in size ought to be less bureaucratic. So should an organization that is aware that its clients have a choice between it and a competitor.

Each of these factors, of course, has its impact on the official-client or the superior-subordinate relationships.¹⁰ But there are other factors worth singling out for their specific impact on these relationships. It is well known, for example, that soldiers in combat relate to others and to their officers in a much less bureaucratic way than they do behind the front lines or in peacetime.¹¹ Closely related findings emerge from a study of the informal social organization that superseded the formal organization of a naval unit on a

⁸ Alvin W. Gouldner, *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1954), pp. 59-101.

⁹ Merton, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 369.

¹⁰ For a discussion of the effect of size, see Thomas, *loc. cit.*

¹¹ Samuel A. Stouffer, *et al.*, *The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath* (Princeton, N.J.: Social Science Research Council, Special Committee, 1949-1950), p. 100.

tiny, unpopulated Pacific island.¹² Similarly, workers on the night shift were treated differently by their supervisors than were day-shift employees,¹³ just as, in Gouldner's study, workers in the mine successfully resisted greater bureaucratization while office workers in the same company did not.¹⁴ The common elements in these situations would seem to be the relative danger or unusualness of the task, the relative isolation from social contacts outside the organization, and relative independence from the immediate presence of upper echelons in the hierarchy. One suspects that certain of these factors would also be appropriate to cases such as Diamond's study of the debureaucratization of a quasi-military group by early American settlers organized as the Virginia Company.¹⁵

As a final example of debureaucratization, Turner's study of the navy disbursing officer during wartime will serve particularly well.¹⁶ Turner indicated several factors that influenced these officers to depart from the orientation prescribed by the rule book to establish more diffuse relations with some of their clients and to show favoritism. First, many clients of the disbursing officer were his superiors in rank and, consequently, his superiors in other role relationships. Secondly, he found it advantageous to help others who could reciprocate, such as the mess officer. This dependence, in part a function of his isolation from other social contacts, was embedded in a more general interdependence

¹² Charles H. Page, "Bureaucracy's Other Face," *Social Forces*, 25 (1946), 89-91.

¹³ Lipset, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

¹⁴ Gouldner, *op. cit.*, pp. 105-54.

¹⁵ Sigmund Diamond, "From Organization to Society: Virginia in the 17th Century," *American Journal of Sociology*, 63 (1958), 588-94.

¹⁶ Turner, *loc. cit.*

created by the war.¹⁷ Finally, client and bureaucrat were dependent on each other because, especially during the war, the higher authorities who were to be consulted in case of doubt were both physically and psychologically distant.

This dependence of clients and officials on each other appears as a key factor in the other cases as well, and for much the same reasons.¹⁸ The danger, the isolation, the aborted hierarchy of combat, the night shift, the mine, the Virginia Company, and the naval unit on the Pacific island made men dependent upon each other over and above the specific relations defined for them by their formal organizations. The attempt to enforce ordinary peacetime or daytime relations under such circumstances—that is, the attempt to behave in the accepted bureaucratic manner, or even more, to be overbureaucratic—is what apparently leads to desertion (where one is able to leave) or to mutiny (where one cannot).

Role Impingement as a Characterization of Bureaucratization and Debureaucratization

The notion of dependence may be viewed sociologically as a special case of the impingement of other role relationships on a given bureaucratic relationship. In Turner's study, for example, the observed debureaucratization could be considered a product of the regularized contacts in other roles that existed between the disbursing officer and his clients. Moreover, if

¹⁷ For example, Turner omits the interdependence based on the common danger.

¹⁸ Note again that we are using "bureaucrat-client" in a generic sense, implying superordinate-subordinate relations (such as in combat, the mine, the Virginia Company) as well.

debureaucratization may be characterized in terms of the impingement of nonbureaucratic roles on bureaucratic ones, then overbureaucratization may be characterized as either the formalistic segregation of a bureaucratic relationship from all other role relations (even relevant ones) or, in its totalitarian form, as the imposition of the bureaucratic relationship on relations outside the scope of the bureaucracy. The bureaucratic ritualist would be an example of one who arbitrarily views all extrabureaucratic roles as irrelevant to the conduct of his office, while the totalitarian bureaucrat "takes his authority home," as, for example, the sergeant bullying his men off duty.

In effect, overbureaucratization and debureaucratization represent a disturbance in the relationship between an organization and its environment that is not envisioned by the classical model of bureaucracy. This model envisages the roles of both bureaucrat and client as segregated to some extent from their other roles; their roles are "specific" to the interaction setting and in this bureaucratic setting it is irrelevant, for example, that both bureaucrat and client belong to the same political club. However, even in the ideal-type bureaucracy a role is not completely independent of other roles; some outside roles clearly may be, or must be, considered. If an old man, obviously unable to wait his turn in a long queue, is given special attention by a clerk, this is not a case of an irrelevant role relationship being allowed incorrectly to impinge on the bureaucrat-client relationship. In general, the classic model of bureaucracy requires only that the bureaucratic organization not be directly dependent on external factors for its manpower, its resources, or its motivation for carrying out its organizational task. If an organization relies directly upon any

one segment of the population for financing, or for political protection, these sources of support will clearly receive particularistic attention in the dispensation of the organization's services. It is such direct dependence that mechanisms such as boards of trustees, budget bureaus, and the like try to avert by insulating bureaucratic organizations from their sources of support. What is true for the organization as a whole is true for its members as well. If a bureaucrat receives direct rewards from outside the organization in addition to, or instead of, his rewards from within, obviously his independence of action as a bureaucrat is thereby reduced.¹⁹

Clearly, then, there is a very delicate balance—varying from organization to organization—between the specific roles defined as relevant to relations within the bureaucracy and those outside roles defined as irrelevant. Note the parallel to our notion of role impingement in Gouldner's concept of "latent identity."²⁰

Israeli Officials and New Immigrants

Increasingly, in recent years, the contact between immigrants and the new societies to which they have come is mediated by professionals and bureaucrats. The customs agent, the so-

¹⁹ To cite a familiar example, a civil servant looking to a political party for rewards for his performance in his role as civil servant may do so because he is a political appointee, because he is ideologically committed to his party, or for other reasons.

²⁰ After developing this analysis of role impingement, we encountered Gouldner's concept and noted its close similarity. . . . Others who have employed analytic concepts similar to the concept of role impingement are Lloyd Fallers, *Bantu Bureaucracy* (Cambridge: Heffer and Heffer, 1957); Frank Jones, *The Infantry Recruit: A Sociological Analysis of Socialization in the Canadian Army*, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard, 1956; Thomas, *loc. cit.*

cial worker, the policeman, the public health nurse, the housing administrator, and the like constitute the immigrants' main connections with the community to which they come, and it is these officials who provide aid and advice, which in earlier migrations were obtained more informally or not at all. This change is characteristic not only of the reception of immigrants in present-day Israel but also of the reception of Puerto Ricans and Southern Negroes in New York and Chicago, and of other immigrant groups in the areas receiving them.²¹ This change is in part a consequence of the greater bureaucratization of these areas in the last generation and in part a consequence of the theory and practice of the welfare state which, adapting itself to the immigrant, proffers many social services unknown to the immigrant of an earlier generation. In Israel, this change is also a consequence of the different pattern of motivation and different demographic composition of present-day immigrants compared with the "pioneer" immigrants of the turn of the century.²²

The remainder of this chapter is devoted to a preliminary discussion of some of the problems arising out of the contact between immigrants to Israel and the officials with whom they deal, viewed against the theoretical considerations set forth in the first part of this chapter. The kind of immigrant with whom we are particularly concerned comes from non-Western countries (such as Yemen, Mo-

²¹ A review, by Nathan Glazer, of several recent books treating Puerto Rican migration makes this point; see "New York's Puerto Ricans," *Commentary*, 26 (1958), pp. 469-78.

²² See S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Absorption of Immigrants* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955), pp. 64-8, 172 ff., "The Framework of Bureaucratic Absorption."

rocco, Iraq, and so on), where he is likely to have had little or no contact with formal organizations.

The question to which we now turn is why so many of the official-client relations observed seemed to be moving in the direction of lesser bureaucratization. We do not mean to imply that Israeli organizations prior to the influx of the non-Western immigrants were close approximations of the Weberian ideal-type, for the small size of the country and the common struggle made for wide networks of interpersonal relations embracing officials and clients alike. The pioneering and egalitarian ideologies frowned on status differentiation, differential distribution of rewards, as well as on formalities of all sorts. Not least important, political parties exerted considerable influence on appointments to and conduct of the public bureaucracies.

As we have already said, the mere increase in organizational size and responsibility might have been expected to result in increased bureaucratization of relations between official and client, between supervisor and worker, and so forth. To this rapid increase in numbers add the divergence of cultural background between the majority of recent immigrants coming from non-Western countries and the European bureaucrats dealing with them, and one would certainly expect an increase in bureaucratic formalism.²³

Yet our preliminary observations indicate that this is not the case. We have, of course, found some evidence of increasing bureaucratization as a response to the influx of new immi-

²³ In 1948, at the time of the establishment of the state of Israel, persons born in Africa and Asia constituted 15 per cent of the population; five years later, in 1953, they constituted 38 per cent of the population. See Moshe Sicion, *Immigration to Israel: 1948-1953* (Jerusalem: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1957), pp. 43-50.

grants. Thus, in one cooperative organization, for example, the hierarchy became sharply elongated. Previously any member was able to reach the highest official of the organization rather directly and informally, nor was it particularly important whether he brought his problem to one or another of the top officials. Now, the same organization has developed a strict chain of command and a new immigrant with a problem must proceed strictly through the established channels and talk only to the relevant official. Yet, even in this organization, as far as the actual interaction between official and client is concerned, there is evidence of considerable debureaucratization.

Repeatedly, however, we have found in institutions as diverse as health clinics and bus companies widespread evidence of debureaucratization in the relationship between officials and new immigrants. We have found cases where the official has assigned himself a greater number of tasks vis-à-vis his clients than those assigned him by his organization. We find considerable evidence of the growth of personal relationships between officials and new immigrants. We have even found cases where the official becomes the leader of a kind of "social movement" composed of new immigrants, thus completely reversing the expected trend which is supposed to lead from movements to bureaucracy. A major key to this unanticipated phenomenon is the notion of dependence we have developed, which takes quite a different form at this point. We shall try to describe what we think we have found, and, in part, we shall do this in terms of case studies. In one case, officials assumed a teaching role vis-à-vis their clients. In another, officials departed from their prescribed role as agents of socialization in certain pat-

terned ways. In the third case, officials became the leaders of an incipient social movement.

Bureaucrats as Teachers: Dependence on the Client's Performance of His Role

The most characteristic form of debureaucratization in the relationship between bureaucrats and new immigrants in Israel is the assumption by the bureaucrat of the role of teacher along with (or at the expense of) his other functions. Consider, for example, the bus driver who gets out of the bus to teach the idea of a queue—"first come, first served"—an idea which is new to many of his new immigrant passengers. Similarly, the nurse at the well-baby clinic may be seen teaching women, informally, which of their needs are appropriate to the health services and which should be taken to other organizations. Or, the manager of the government-subsidized grocery in the new immigrant settlement may take the initiative and go into homes to teach housewives how to prepare certain foods with which they have had no previous experience.

In all these examples, the bureaucrat takes the time and effort to teach a client something about his (the bureaucrat's) expectations concerning how the client role is to be played. In other words, the bureaucrat teaches the client how to be a client so that he (the bureaucrat) can go on being a bureaucrat. This, it seems to us, is a form of dependence, but one which we have not considered so far; it is dependence on the client to act in a way which makes it possible for the bureaucrat to do his job.

In other words, it is expected by the bureaucrat and the bureaucracy that the client will bring with him to the bureaucratic context certain knowl-

edge of expected roles from "outside," even though he may have had no previous contact with this particular bureaucracy. In Western society, for example, one is prepared for one's first encounter with a customs inspector by virtue of one's single-purpose relationships with other officials, tradesmen, and the like. When this preparation is lacking, the bureaucrat himself, in the examples cited, added a dimension—teaching—to his relationship with the client. And this change is an example of debureaucratization both because it adds another role to the specifically prescribed one and because the quality of interaction in the teacher-student relationship necessarily impinges on the more formal bureaucrat-client relationship. Yet these are the very elements which are officially alien to the ideal-type bureaucracy.²⁴ What is more, as we shall presently see, the teaching relationship may bring further debureaucratization, although conceivably it may simply permit the bureaucrat to perform his role as originally prescribed.

Consider the case of the bus driver. Introductory texts in sociology like to cite the driver-passenger relationship as an example of a purely instrumental, secondary relationship. Neither party matters to the other as an individual. One would not expect the bus driver to modify his behavior vis-à-vis new immigrants or anybody else, yet our preliminary observations seem to indicate that he does. Like other bureaucrats who come into contact with new immigrants, the bus driver tends to assume a teaching role, too. Besides trying to teach the idea of queuing, bus drivers were observed trying to per-

suade immigrant passengers that the cost of a ride on one bus was the same as the cost on the bus that had just gone by, or that the driver did not personally profit from each fare he collected, or that the decision for the bus to leave the terminal was not his. The consequences of the formal organization of a bus company that are understood by client and bureaucrat in modern society are simply not "obvious" to the non-Western immigrant. . . .

It is important to note, however, that an official's dependence on the client to perform his role is probably of a different order from the kinds of dependence we discussed in the other examples reviewed in the first part of this chapter. In the earlier examples, the client actually had power over the bureaucrat—he could affect his well-being both as a member of the bureaucratic organization and as an individual. Thus, the clients of the disbursing officer were his superiors in other relationships, or the men in combat or in the mine could withdraw their reciprocal protection of their superior. In the present instance, however, the passenger has power over the driver in very much the same sense that a baby has power to disrupt the family schedule, and clearly this creates dependence of quite a different order.²⁵

²⁵ Replying to a query whether the "dependency" of the child does not sometimes confer power equal to or superior to that of the person on whom dependency exists, Parsons distinguishes between power defined as "relative importance in carrying out the functional performance of the system" and as the "ability to cause trouble by threatening to disrupt the system." In this latter sense, "the child, and other persons or groups in dependent positions have considerable 'power.'" See Talcott Parsons and Robert F. Bales, *Family, Socialization and Interaction Process* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955), p. 46, n. 18. It is this second type of power which concerns us at this point.

²⁴ This would be particularly true when a bureaucrat's aim is to bring his client to want the bureaucrat's services; thus, this might be more true of a storekeeper than a nurse, and more true of a nurse than a bus driver.

Bureaucrats as Socializing Agents

The process of a bureaucrat stepping outside his role to teach a new immigrant how to act his role as client is highly reminiscent of the processes of socialization and social control as analyzed by Parsons.²⁶ In the socialization of the child, or in the process of psychotherapy, the socializing agent steps out of his place in the larger social system and assumes a role in the "deviant" subsystem. Thus, the mother is a member of the inclusive family system consisting of father, mother, and children. To bring a new child into this more inclusive system, she must use her role in the earlier mother-child subsystem and selectively reward the child for obedience and disobedience to the new expectations of the inclusive system while at the same time providing a basis of support for the child in his effort to learn the new role. At times, however, the mother may fail as socializing agent, because she herself prefers to remain in the "deviant" subsystem and, ignoring the father and the rest of the family, acts to "keep the child for herself."

The parallel seems striking to us. The assumption of a teaching role by the bureaucrat and the "personalizing" of the bureaucrat-client relationship seems to function for the process of immigrant socialization as does the behavior of the socializing agent vis-à-vis the child. One of the objects of our empirical study will be to determine whether this kind of bureaucratic behavior (whatever its dysfunctions for the organizational routine) contributes more to the adaptation of the new immigrant than the unbending bureaucrat-client relationship.

Even more striking, perhaps, is the parallel to the kind of mother who

"keeps the child for herself." Thus, a bureaucrat who has assumed a teaching role may fail to bring the new immigrant client to play the role expected of him by the bureaucracy and may, instead, remain a member of the "deviant" subsystem. This possibility is most conspicuous perhaps in the case of the village instructors who are assigned to each new settlement of immigrants. These instructors are part of a regional Settlement Authority which, in turn, is part of a nationwide Settlement Department. Sometimes, instead of mediating between the new immigrants and the authorities, the instructor becomes so much a part of his village community that his major effort is devoted to "representing" the interests of his clients vis-à-vis the authorities.

The village instructor typically lives among his clients and is potentially available all day long. His job, as compared with the bus driver's, is a highly diffuse one and includes teaching the settlers, who were semiskilled craftsmen or peddlers, to be farmers, co-operators (as this is understood in the *moshav*),²⁷ and Israelis. In this case debureaucratization is manifested not merely in the establishment of informal relations, but rather in the surrendering of part of the bureaucrat's commitment to his bureaucracy in favor of acceptance of a role in the system which he is expected to change.

Of course, this is only one of the ways that the instructor—given his highly diffuse and flexible role—can

²⁷ See S. N. Eisenstadt, "Sociological Aspects of the Economic Adaptation of Oriental Immigrants in Israel: A Case Study of Modernization," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 4 (1958), 269-78; Alex Weingrod, *From the Millah to the Moshav: Culture Contact and Change in a New-Immigrant Village in Israel*, unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, 1959.

shape his relations with his clients. Some instructors, obviously, take quite the opposite position. The control of the resources necessary for the very existence of their clients permits them to move in the direction of overbureaucratization. They may interfere in matters—religious observance, for example—which ought properly to be outside their (very broad) spheres of influence.

An even more complicating factor is that the instructor, apart from his bureaucratic role, is often eager to make his clients full-fledged members of the nationwide small-holders cooperative movement or even of his political party, and to have them identify with its ideology, participate in its activities, and so on. Among the instructors who play this double role—which is by no means always considered illegitimate by the upper echelon of the Settlement Authority—many tend to view the various aspects of their bureaucratic role of training immigrants in agriculture and administration as a means to the end of full citizenship. This goal, for the ideologically oriented Israeli, implies the assumption of political and ideological commitments. Such instructors aim at making their clients members of a solidary movement of which they themselves are a part. This subsidiary aim makes the instructor even more dependent on the settlers. They may easily threaten not to participate in the movement unless the instructor provides them with various benefits and allocations for which he is the intermediary, though these may not be their due. In response the instructor may either move in the direction of debureaucratization and succumb to these demands, or he may attempt to use his bureaucratic position to force the clients to assume the political and ideological roles he envisages for them.

Bureaucrats as Leaders

A bureaucrat serving as "representative" or as "organizer" of his clients is by no means the extreme example of the kind of debureaucratization which may result from the bureaucrat's assumption of the role of socializing agent. Sometimes bureaucrats become charismatic leaders of groups of their clients.

Consider, for example, the case of several nurses employed at a well-baby clinic in a relatively segregated immigrants' "transitional community" within one of the major cities. In this setting the nurse—like the village instructor—is expected to be a teacher and to establish the kind of relationship required for successful teaching. Thus, along with the curative and preventive medicine practiced in such clinics, she must teach the women how to care for themselves and for their children in the particular manner prescribed by the modern scientific and philosophical orientation of the well-baby clinic. The authority of the nurses observed, however, extended beyond these rather broadly defined functions. They became generalized counselors and the clinic soon took on the air of a kind of social center where women gathered to greet each other, to gossip, and to move within the orbit of the nurses.

Some of the nurses had become preoccupied with the position of women in non-Western families. Apparently, this particular problem had first attracted attention as a result of the frequently negative reactions of their clients' husbands to one or another of the practices recommended by the clinic. Having thus become sensitized to the subordinate role of their clients within their families, the nurses added the reconciliation of family conflict to

their counseling efforts, and, in fact, some of the nurses considered it part of their job to teach women their "rights" vis-à-vis their husbands. In several instances we have even heard nurses recommending divorce to their clients! Step by step, then, these nurses seem to have moved out from their broad but relatively well-defined functions (which include teaching) to assume an even broader teaching and counseling role and, in some instances, to leadership of a kind of "suffragette" movement among their clients. In such cases, the leader does not appear averse to illustrating her message with reference to her own private life or that of her friends. And to the extent that they follow, the clients look to their leaders for active support and

The Party Cadre

FRANZ SCHURMANN

The Cadre Concept and Its Development

Before we continue the discussion of the organizational development of the Chinese Communist party, something must be said about the cadres. The word "cadre" has by now become so common in the Western literature on Communist China that it is usually taken for granted. Yet the real significance of the cadre concept is not always fully understood.¹

Franz Schurmann, "The Party Cadre," *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), pp. 162-172.

¹ For a discussion of cadres based on Soviet conceptions, see Philip Selznick, *The Organizational Weapon, A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics* (New York, Toronto, Lon-

don, 1952), pp. 18-20. Selznick uses the term "deployable personnel" to characterize the Soviet conception of the cadre. As is evident from our discussion, this collectivist conception is different from the individualist conception of the Chinese Communists.

guidance, and for a share in the consequences of their behavior. The leadership role, as played by the bureaucrat, represents a considerable degree of debureaucratization. It represents, in part, exchange of the authority vested in the bureaucratic office for the "voluntary" loyalty of clients; that is, such leadership exists not only by virtue of an "appointment" but by virtue of being "chosen" by followers as well. To that extent, the bureaucrat must submit himself to the authority, and to some of the norms, of his followers. Moreover, he has considerably extended the sphere of his influence from the specific tasks assigned to him to the wider, more diffuse, tasks inherent in the leadership role.

Strictly speaking, a cadre (or *kanpu* in Chinese) is someone who holds a formal leadership position in an organization. A Party secretary is a Party cadre; a military officer is a military cadre; an official is a government cadre; and so on. However, the cadre concept is so fundamental to Chinese Communist organizational thinking that it has acquired connotations far beyond its basic meaning. Colloquially, the word cadre generally refers to Party members who exercise leadership roles. It is also used to designate a leadership style. A cadre is a leader who is supposed to lead in a certain way. The ideal cadre is supposed to

act as a combat leader, in intimate relationship with his followers, yet always responsive to higher policy.

Every cadre in Communist China has a specific rank. Tables of cadre rank (*pienchi*) exist for every unit of organization. These tables are essentially similar to the *nomenklatura* in the Soviet Union.² They are the basis for salary payments and promotions. When cadres are transferred from one unit to another, the basis for promotion and transfer is the table of cadre-ranking.³ In the strictly formal sense, the Chinese Communist cadre is similar to his Soviet counterpart. However, there are important differences in leadership style.⁴ The following pages will briefly discuss the evolution of the cadre concept in Communist China.

Lenin ended his *What Is to Be Done* with a prediction that "the real vanguard of the most revolutionary class" would now emerge and lead

the revolution. From the beginning, the Chinese Communist party never doubted that it was the vanguard of the Chinese revolution. During the first fifteen years of the history of Chinese communism, the vanguard emerged, but there were struggles as to who was the true vanguard. A new approach began during the Yanan period. It was now thought that the vanguard must not simply "emerge," but must be created, trained, and "cultivated." As a result, the Chinese Communists developed a continuing concern, in theory and practice, with the problem of leadership. The central concept in this new approach was that of the cadre.

² The *nomenklatura* is kept highly secret in the Soviet Union. Thanks to the Smolensk documents, we have some idea of how the *nomenklatura* operates in the Soviet Union; see Merle Fainsod, *Smolensk under Soviet Rule* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), pp. 64-5. We have no comparable documents for Communist China.

³ The difficulty in obtaining information on the Chinese Communist *nomenklatura* is indicated by the fact that even Taiwan intelligence publications have little to report on the subject. The most complete treatment I have yet seen is *Kungfei jenshih Koshih chih yenchiu* (Taipei, 1957), particularly pp. 190 ff.

⁴ The Russians use the word *cadre* to designate the men of the vanguard, but mostly in its collective sense. The Russian use is true to its etymology and the way it is understood in the West. The Japanese introduced the word into the Far East, and it soon found its way into the Chinese language. At first, the Chinese Communists understood the word *kanpu* in its collective sense, but in time it changed from a collective to an individual connotation—the Chinese Communist *kanpu* became an individual leader.

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During the Yanan period the Chinese Communists began to think systematically about cadres. The word was widely used in Chinese Communist literature before that time, but without discussion of what was meant by it. Even in some of Mao's writings during the early years of the Yanan period, discussions of the cadre concept and cadre policy are still phrased in generalities.⁵ By the late 1930's, however, discussion of the cadre concept becomes more precise. Liu Shao-ch'i, in particular, began to write widely on the subject. Mao Tse-tung, in his "Position of the Chinese Communist Party in the National Struggle," dated October 1938, devotes a whole section to "cadre policy." Mao starts off by saying that "without many leadership cadres possessing both ability and virtue, our Party cannot fulfill its historical tasks." The phrase "ability and virtue" is simply an earlier version of the later "red and expert"; the idea,

⁵ See, for example, Mao Tse-tung, "Fight for the Participation of the Masses in the Unified Struggle against Japan," *Selected Works* (Chinese edition), I, 267-68; the report is dated May 7, 1937.