

Household and family in past time

Comparative studies in the size and structure of the domestic group over the last three centuries in England, France, Serbia, Japan and colonial North America, with further materials from Western Europe

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the history of the family, by*

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which itself tended towards the atomisation of life. But this preparation took place a long time before the event. Once again it appears that the West was able to spread over several generations the task of adaptation which changes of such a profound kind necessarily implied. It had the good fortune to escape the painful and sudden mutations which now affect so many of the developing countries. It is for the historian to recover the pace and the rhythm of this growth, viewing it in the perspective of the long term evolutionary process, to mark its points of departure, even the occasional retracing of its path. The situation in 1801 has only given us one point of reference on a curve which will be traced out in full only if other censuses are worked upon by the method of cohort analysis, which is a method essentially historical in character.

14. The zadruga as process

E. A. Hammel

I. INTRODUCTION

The large and complex households reported from the Balkans have excited scholarly attention for many years; to intellectuals who were themselves living in an urban-industrial environment and in conjugal units that seldom contained any added relatives other than an unwelcome mother-in-law, households reputed to have up to a hundred members demanded explanation. Such explanations have taken a variety of forms: historical, evolutionist, functional, psychological, economic, legalist. Most of them have had implicit or explicit political or ideological intent, or have at least had such intent attributed to them.¹ They may regard the complex household as a survival of a more primitive state common to many people, or typical of 'retarded' development, or as a retention of alleged Slavic tendencies to peaceful cooperation in contrast to Germanic individuality and aggressiveness. They may suggest social conditions that stimulated its growth: the need for a body of coresident males for defense in frontier situations, the existence of a hearth tax or similar dues that made group living more economical, the advantages to household economy in a finer division of labor – or those that led to its decline: the introduction of private property and of a money economy that stimulated individuality and the division of extended households. Some discussions even attribute variation in the form of the complex household to invidious differences in national character.²

¹ Mandić (1950). In this connection compare Klapisch's description of the *società della torri* in medieval Italy, see above, Chapter 10, pp. 280–281.

² The literature on the zadruga is extensive. Apart from the individual descriptive monographs in *Srpski Etnografski Zbornik* and similar series, some of the more useful references are: Bogišić (1874); Erlich, *The southern Slav patriarchal family* (1940) and *The family in transition* (1966); Filipović (1945); Halpern, *A Serbian village* (1967); Halpern and Anderson, *The zadruga a century of change* (1970); J. and B. Halpern, *Orašac* (1972); Hammel, *Alternative social structures and ritual relations in the Balkans* (1968); Hammel, *Social mobility, economic change and kinship in Serbia* (1969 i); Hammel, *Structure and sentiment in Serbian cousinship* (1969 ii); Jiriček (1912) and (1952); Jovanović (1896); Karanović (1929); Krauss (1885); Kulišić (1955); Lilek (1900); Mandić (1950); Moseley, *The peasant family* (1940), *Adaptation for survival* (1943) and *The distribution of the zadruga* (1953); Nikolić (1958); Nimac et al. (1960); Novaković (1891); Pantelić (1964); Pavković (1961); Sicard, *La zadruga dans la littérature serbe* (1943) and *Problèmes familiaux chez les Slaves du Sud* (1947); Švob and Petrić (1929); Tomasevich, *Peasants, politics and economic change in Yugoslavia* (1955):

With a few notable exceptions,³ discussions of these households have focused on legal, economic, and political aspects. Only a few authors have examined the data from the standpoint of kinship and of kinship process. Moreover, a good deal of the often acrimonious debate, so tinged with accusations of political orthodoxy or dereliction, is characterized by an abundance of hypotheses in the absence of fact, or by an abundance of fact in the absence of coherent theory. The difficulties are particularly intense in discussion of the decline of the institution of the complex household during the last hundred years; one is never certain whether the baseline of historical comparison is the complex household as it existed or that household as it was envisaged by authors afflicted by the most severe symptoms of romanticism. Thus, while the decline of the institution as a set of behavioral patterns is in part incontestable, it is in part a function of a particular ideology or myth among intellectuals.

For all these reasons, but particularly because of the political connotations associated with 'positions' on the household structure of the Balkans, it is an uncomfortable subject. It is therefore incumbent on any author to make explicit what his analysis is and what it is not about. This chapter is quite definitely not a history of the complex household in the Balkans but at best only a prolegomenon to one. It is not much concerned with its formal legal aspects (and particularly not with the conflicts between Byzantine, medieval, Ottoman, Austrian, and Napoleonic law in respect to it); neither is it much concerned with individual psychology, individualism, the effects of money economy, national character, or explanations by cultural determinism. In failing to give primary weight even to the more useful of these traditional variables (such as legal aspects and economic conditions), it does not omit them but rather views them as general constraints and shifts attention to a set of factors usually ignored. This set concerns kinship and those aspects of social organization related to it. Although analysis from the worm's eye view of kinship is second nature to social anthropologists, its relevance is not always apparent to others, and a few introductory comments on the utility of the anthropological view in analysis of the complex household are in order.

While the existence of complex households on our own doorstep in Europe has

178-89; Tomasić, *Personality and culture in Eastern European politics* (1948). Most of the varying views on the *zadruga* are covered in these sources. Among the older ones, Bogišić, Novaković, and Sicard provide some of the best data, and Novaković's interpretations are superior to most of those that have followed. Moseley's work is valuable, Halpern and Anderson provide the most sophisticated demographic analysis, and J. and B. Halpern offer additional discussion of change over the last hundred years. A strong Marxist critique of theories is given by Mandić and Tomasevich gives the most extensive, balanced review of the problem in English.

I am indebted to Dr Lorraine Barić for insisting on the individuality of the Croatian *zadruga*, to Professors Burton Benedict, Maurice Freedman, Peter Laslett, G. William Skinner, Jozo Tomasevich, Arthur Wolf, and Mrs Gail Venti for their comments, and to George Šoć and Virginia Aldrich for assistance in coding and computing. None of them, of course, is responsible for any errors of fact or interpretation that may remain in the analysis.

³ See below, pp. 362-369.

been a matter for comment and speculation on why Balkan households are so *different*, their presence does not much surprise (as much as it delights) the anthropologist, who is more likely to ask in what ways they are the *same* as the many other manifestations of such household structure with which he is familiar.⁴ It is this question – how the Balkan households are similar to other complex households – that concerns us here. An anthropologist would look for typical, underlying, fundamental structural reasons for the similarities – for what my British colleagues are fond of calling 'first principles'. The intent of this chapter is to demonstrate that the combination of some basic principles, such as lineage organization, virifocality, patrilocality, and agnatic bias⁵ (which are all of a piece in societies with patrilineal-like organization in the present or in their immediate past), together with certain demographic rates and particular external constraints, will produce the complex households of the Balkans. This chapter will also attempt to show that the historical changes in household organization in the Balkans can be attributed largely to alteration in demographic rates and external constraints, rather than to changes in underlying principles of organization, which have remained remarkably constant.⁶

Studies of the complex household in the Balkans almost always regard those that are actually observed as imperfect examples of a Platonic ideal type, of an archetypical extended household. Some households are observed to be small, others large, but these variations are usually placed on a simple linear scale of achievement of the type. Seldom is any account taken of a variety of conflicting influences or of the possibility that a household can be large at one time and small at another – *in particular that households may have a developmental cycle and that there may also be seasonal variations in their structure.*⁷

These considerations of *cyclical* microvariation in time affect the way in which data from the field or from archival sources are analysed and also the way in which one speaks of macrovariation or *secular* developmental trends in the history of the institution. It is useful, first of all, to differentiate between two major forms of extended household (although in doing this I may appear only to substitute two ideal types for one). One of these was a formally constituted corporation, found principally among Serbs in the Croatian Military Border and codified in Austrian law. This kind of household could grow or diminish in size; one household could divide into several or several could merge into one; persons could be added or dropped. However, changes in its constitution and the acqui-

⁴ See in particular the study by Goody of dwelling and work groups in Africa and Asia, above, Chapter 3, pp. 103-124.

⁵ By virifocality I mean the organization of domestic groups around a core of males, by patrilocality the rule of postmarital residence whereby a wife lives with her husband, who has remained with his own father, and by agnatic bias the tendency for social organization to arrange itself according to groupings of persons related only (in cultural recognition) through males.

⁶ See Halpern and Anderson (1970); Hammel (1969 i and 1969 ii).

⁷ See Goody, *The developmental cycle in domestic groups* (1958 i). See also above, Goody, Chapter 3, pp. 118, 122.

sition and alienation of property were not casual matters, for it was a formal corporation: important steps had to be agreed to by all adult males and often had to be approved by the local military commandant. This type of household certainly had historical roots in kinship organization, but it was sufficiently formalized, and the possibility of inclusion of nonkin was sufficiently regularized, that it was in its most developed form an institution of rather different surface structure from the ordinary extended household or kinship-based local group found in so many societies and probably common in the proto-Slavic and Indo-European past.⁸ I regard it as the *formalized* epitome of a particular form of kinship-based group.⁹

I have thus far avoided using the traditional epithet for these complex households, for use of the word is apt to call only a particular variety of organizational form to mind. The formally corporate household of Croatia, and particularly of the Military Border, was called a zadruga. This paper is not about that kind of zadruga but rather about a second, found principally in Serbia, Montenegro, Hercegovina, and parts of Bosnia, that was precisely of the ordinary, kinship-based type. It is also known in the literature as the zadruga, or more exactly as the *porodična* or *obiteljska* (familial) zadruga. While the formal zadruga has disappeared with the law codes that enshrined it, the familial zadruga still persists in many rural areas. Although nonkin can be included in it, such inclusion is rare, and it shows a clear developmental cycle based in the mechanisms of familial growth. In areas of mixed farming and herding it also exhibits seasonal variation in size and structure. In peasant tradition, the older historical documents, and some of the literature these households were not known as zadrugas at all but simply by the ordinary words for house (*kuća*, *dom*); zadruga, as a term for them, has come into modern peasant speech from the nationalistic folkloristic literature of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.¹⁰

⁸ For general parallels in kinship organization among Indo-European peoples see Jiriček (1912) pt. 1: 36–9, *passim*, and (1952): 51–2. Olsen, *Farms and fanes of ancient Norway* (1928): 43–6, gives an interesting parallel from Norwegian and Icelandic data, and I am obliged to Harry Todd for bringing it to my attention. Much of the argument for agnatic structure among Indo-European peoples rests on kinship terminology and its possible implications. See particularly Friedrich, *Semantic structure and social structure* (1964) and *The linguistic reflex of social change* (1966); Hammel, *Serbo-Croatian kinship terminology* (1957); Hammel (1968): 26–31; Lounsbury, *A formal account of the Crow- and Omaha-type kinship terminologies* (1964).

⁹ The formalized zadruga of the Military Border, in which land ownership was tied to military service, developed with the organization of the Border itself, beginning as early as the sixteenth century. Heritable land was limited almost exclusively to soldiers (in lieu of pay) in 1754 and conditions of ownership were further limited and tied to military service in 1807. Unanimous agreement by all members was required for division until 1850, after which time the majority could decide on division, the severity of other regulations concerning the tie between land ownership and military service was relaxed, and land owned by families in the Border was considered fully heritable and less in the nature of a fief. The Border was demilitarized in 1873. For fuller discussion of the Military Border, see Tomasevich (1955): 74 ff.

¹⁰ Neither the formal-legal zadruga nor the family zadruga are to be confused with the *zemljoradnička* zadruga now found in Yugoslavia; this organization is a farmers' cooperative for the sale of produce and purchase of farm equipment and supplies.

My intention is to show that the familial zadruga is basically a product of patrilocal extension and virifocality, that it seldom remained intact for more than two full generations, and that it existed in the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries in some areas in a form not substantially different in structure or even in size from that found in those areas in the nineteenth century and even today. Although the typical household of modern rural Serbia is not the same as the typical one of the nineteenth century or earlier, the changes have been of degree rather than of kind; the process of change has not been one of dissolution but of reformulation.¹¹ One cannot accept citation of the number of nonextended conjugal households or of divisions of extended households or mention of other simplistic indicators as *prima facie* evidence for the decay of the institution; indeed, one could have claimed the decline of the zadruga on precisely the same sort of evidence and with equal credibility in the fourteenth or the sixteenth century.¹²

An institution that has been 'decaying' for 600 years is worth looking at again. If the zadruga is an extended household, it can be expected to begin, minimally, with a man and his wife, to add married sons, and then to divide into separate households in the second or later generations. Many of the resulting households will consist of subsets of brothers who have continued their joint endeavors, but others will contain only one man with his wife and children.¹³ The existence of minimally extended or nonextended households is not necessarily evidence for the decline of the extended household as an institution but only for the division of particular ones. Even an increase in the number of nonextended households or in that of legal divisions of households cannot be taken as evidence for decline of the institution unless corrections are made for population growth; the number of nuclear households or of divisions of complex ones will increase in a growing population even though their proportion in the set of all households remains the same.

The historical background against which this consistency of kinship is portrayed is anything but constant; indeed, the purpose of the analysis is to point up the rather remarkable conservatism in *underlying* kinship principles *despite* the cultural flux of Balkan history. When the Serbs first came to the Balkans,

¹¹ J. and B. Halpern (1972).

¹² Cf. Bičanić, quoted in Erlich (1964): 337.

¹³ In this chapter, I use the English term, 'household', as a gloss for the native terms, *kuća* or *dom*. The terminology used by Laslett and Clarke, Chapter 15, pp. 376–379 (compare Laslett, Chapter 1, pp. 34–40), distinguishes between the *household* as an explicit, coresidential familial unit containing a single conjugal pair or its remnants, with or without miscellaneous added relatives but not including any further conjugal pairs or their remnants who are not related to any member of the primary unit, and *houseful*, as an explicitly coresidential unit consisting of associated *households*. Although that terminology may be useful for English data or for some purposes of comparative analysis, I have not adopted it, for it creates precisely the illusion of sharp difference between the units in the houseful that I wish to avoid and obscures the fundamental *ethnographically valid* developmental continuum in Serbia from the simple conjugal family, through the patrilocal extended family, to the fraternal joint family. A similar problem arises with the Rhode Island Census of 1875, see below, Pryor, Chapter 22, p. 582.

they were probably organized in patrilineages only loosely linked to one another, practicing a combination of simple agriculture and herding. Those that pushed high into the inhospitable limestone mountains, replacing and mixing with the Romanized Illyrians that had preceded them, came to depend more on herding and manifested a tribal political organisation until the nineteenth century. Those that came under the control of the Serbian medieval state, as it replaced Byzantium, became agricultural serfs. Some serfs fled their bondage to take up herding, some herders came under the control of the medieval state. The political, economic, and ecological histories of the Balkans are inextricably mixed, with populations flowing in enormous migrations from one region, from one ecological niche to another, as conquerors (such as the Turks and Austrians) came and went, as the conditions of life became temporarily better or worse. Much of the variation in family structure and lineage organization can be attributed to shifts from settled agriculture to herding or the reverse, to the appearance and disappearance of opportunities to pioneer new land, to the introduction of economic alternatives such as the opportunity for occasional or permanent employment in provincial mines and industries and the effects of all these factors on traditional patterns of personal interrelationship and authority. Nothing in this analysis should be taken to suggest that *no* change has occurred; rather it is the intent to show that change has indeed taken place, but that it is not simple or unilinear, and that it is the result of the interaction of factors on a fundamental kinship process.¹⁴

These remarks are intended only to illustrate the theoretical context for and disciplinary bias of the analysis, which is centered on an examination of the earliest explicit household census data for the Balkans now available to me. These data consist of two sixteenth-century Turkish tax rolls (*defter*) translated into Serbo-Croatian by Hazim Šabanović.¹⁵ One of them gives excellent detail on the kinship relationships between coresident adult males in 2,002 households in 156 villages; the other gives the proportion of married to unmarried males in 2,614 households in 146 of the same villages within perhaps two years of the first tax roll, permitting a more accurate interpretation of it. I will first give a brief sketch of Turkish administrative practice and of pertinent historical events (following Šabanović and others) to place these documents in perspective and then go on to a more detailed analysis of the data.

II. THE OTTOMAN CENSUSES

Within a few years of the definitive conquest of the Serbian medieval empire at Kosovo (1389), that is by the reign of Mehmed I (1403–21), the Turks began a series of careful censuses of their changing domain that was to continue for five centuries. Regular census-taking on a large scale in the Balkans seems to have

¹⁴ See Hammel (1969 i and 1969 ii) for discussion of the persistence of agnatic ideology.

¹⁵ Šabanović (1964).




Fig. 14.1 Serbia and neighbouring areas

begun with the reign of Mehmed II (The Conqueror, 1451–81), after the fall of Constantinople in 1453. Three known censuses of areas now in Yugoslavia come from this period, but even these were carried out before the classic period of Turkish administration of the Balkans that began with the fall of Smederevo (Semendria) in 1459 and the inclusion of the Serbian Despotism into the Ottoman Empire as the *Sandžak* of Smederevo.

Turkish censuses were generally of two types, with regard to the occasion for their implementation. General censuses of the entire empire were taken on the ascension of a new sultan or at regular intervals thereafter, usually every ten years. Local censuses were taken on the occasion of major changes in the territorial extent of an administrative division of any level, major changes in the organization of governmental administration, or changes in the tax laws. The process of census-taking was thus quite regular and firmly institutionalized. Vassals of the sultan were required to furnish documentary evidence of all sources of income and to bring all their serfs before the census commission. Administrative personnel at all levels, including the headmen of districts or of villages with populations enjoying special status (such as shepherds, see below, p. 345), were directly involved in the process and responsible for the accuracy of their statements and of those of their political subordinates. The preliminary counts made by the census commission were then checked in the field, compared to previous censuses for consistency, and then assembled into the final, detailed, census document (*defter-i müssafal*).

The instructions frequently found in these censuses indicate that officials were required to count, in addition to material resources, all vassals of the sultan, all district and village headmen, and all other persons defined as feudal dependents, including agricultural peasant serfs, shepherds, or other categories of persons from whom feudal dues were demanded. Effectively, the census-takers counted only *mature males capable of work, excluding all women unless they were heads of households and all immature males unless they were living with such female heads of households or were heads of households themselves*. The method of listing persons differed; one roster examined here is apparently organized by households, giving the name of the head and of each coresident adult male, with the kinship linkage of each to the head. Others apparently give only the heads of households, sometimes implying the relationship between heads of households by giving the names of their fathers. A second list examined here gives heads of households and unmarried adult males, without their family connections being explicit in the data or implicit in the ordering of the list. Some censuses give a summary of the tax income due from the village, and some give in addition particular tax rates for individuals in special social categories, such as widows, cripples, or Moslems.

I have given this detail on administrative practice because it bears on the accuracy and interpretation of the data. Šabanović's assessment of the quality of the data is high; he cites the administrative checks and balances designed to

reduce error and evasion, including severe fines and other punishment; he also points to the skill and local knowledge of the scribes, who must have been of native origin because of the accuracy of their transcription of Albanian and Serbo-Croatian words into Arabo-Turkish consonantal script. Šabanović does, however, caution the reader not to assume that the census sample constitutes the entire population; even though the entire tributary population was supposed to be counted and although there were severe punishments for evasion, some fraction may have slipped through the net, and some portions of the population were not dependent. The sample thus may not be perfectly representative, not to mention exhaustive. One check on accuracy lies in the consistency of successive censuses of the same area – a check apparently used by the Turks themselves. A brief exercise in the examination of consistency is instructive. I have compared the Censuses of 1528, 1530, 1536 and 1560 for four villages; to do more is not directly germane to this paper but rather to the subject of general population growth and settlement pattern, and the data from just these four will illustrate the problem.

One village (Srednja Ostružnica) had eight households and seventeen adult males in 1528. In 1530 it had twelve households and fourteen adult males, having lost three (or four) households with a total of six males and gained eight new males. By 1536 it had twenty households but had lost nine of those given in 1530 and had added seventeen new males apparently unrelated to anyone in the earlier lists. By 1560 there were only ten households, and only two of these seem related to any of those in the earlier accounts.

The second village (Brusnik or Poresnik) had eleven households with sixteen adult males in 1528. In 1530 it had fourteen households with seventeen adult males but had lost seven of the households present in 1528. In 1536 it had ten households with fourteen males, but only two of the households and four of the men had been present in 1528, and one more household, with one man, had been present in 1530. In 1560 it had eleven households and fifteen adult males, but only one household with one man had been in any previous census (1528). The third village (Marijovac or Markovac) shows much better correspondence. In 1528 there were ten households with twenty-seven males; in 1530 there were twenty-two households with twenty-three males, all but two of whom seem related to the males of 1528. In 1536 there were fourteen households with seventeen males, twelve of whom seem related to males in the Census of 1530. By 1560 there were only three households, with three men, two of whom seem related to males in the Census of 1536. The fourth village (Donji Doljani) had eight households in 1528 with sixteen men. In 1530 it had eight households with ten men, all apparently related to the earlier ones. In 1536 it had ten households with fifteen men, of whom nine seem related to those of 1530, and by 1560 it had eleven households with thirteen men, only three of whom seem related to those of 1536.¹⁶

¹⁶ Compare the durability of households in Tokugawa Japan, below, Smith, Chapter 17, pp. 438–440, 470–471, Hayami, Chapter 18, pp. 513–515, and in nineteenth-century France, above, Blayo, Chapter 9, pp. 261–264.

Judgment of kinship relationship in these lists depends on rather skimpy data; we have only the first names of the males and of their fathers, sometimes with varyingly transparent substitution of nicknames or changes in spelling. Nevertheless, it is clear either that there was a high turnover of population or that the census takers were extraordinarily inefficient. Šabanović's praise of intended administrative efficiency is impressive, and one can hardly imagine that an experienced extractive administration like the Ottoman one would have been excessively lax in counting people for tax purposes.

There are other indications that the variation stems primarily from population movement; this conclusion will prove valuable in subsequent interpretation. For example, in the Census of 1530 there are a number of localities termed *mezra*. A *mezra* was an abandoned village, the lands of which were worked by inhabitants of a neighboring village, the latter being responsible for the taxes on it. In that Census there was about one *mezra* for every seven occupied villages, so that an eighth of the villages were abandoned. Additionally, ten of the villages in the Census of 1528 do not even appear as *mezre* (pl.) in the Census of 1530, suggesting that they may have been abandoned but that their lands had not been taken over by neighboring peasants. Thus, almost a fifth of the villages of 1528 may have lost their resident populations by 1530.

III. THE VLACHS AND THE SERHAT (FRONTIER) IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

Further evidence, also important for interpretation in comparison with earlier and later statements on household size and structure, lies in the title of the 1528 Census: *Defter-i bazi eflâkân-i livâ-i Semendire*, in Šabanović's Serbo-Croatian translation, *Popis nekih Vlaha Smederevskog Sandžaka* (Census of certain Vlachs of the Sandžak of Smederevo). The word, 'Vlach,' in this title does not refer to any of the latinic-speaking shepherd groups now known from the Carpathians or the Istrian peninsula but is a generic term for shepherd; Šabanović occasionally gives the parenthetical gloss, *stočar*, stockman.¹⁷ The Vlachs played

¹⁷ Vlach is a word of Germanic origin, with the essential meaning 'foreign,' applied to the Celts or to the Romans. In Britain it meant the non-Anglo-Saxon population, that is, the Britons or Romanized Britons and survives in *Welsh*, *Wales*, *Cornwall*, and the surname *Wallace*. OE forms are *Welisc*, *Waelisc*, etc., from OHG *wal(a)hisc*, corresponding to G. *welsch*, with the meanings 'Roman,' 'Italian,' 'French.' The Dutch form *waalsch* survives as *Walloon*. The Germanic root, *walxaz*, was taken over into Latin – cf. L. *Volcae*, a Celtic tribe. Subsequently, the word was taken over by the Slavs. Miklosich (1963): 68, s.v. *vlah* notes, 'vocabulum, uti videtur, celticum, quod a celtis ad germanos et ab his ad slavos migravit.' The Slavs used the word to designate the Romanized Illyrians they displaced and also the inhabitants of some cities on the Adriatic. With the passage of time it took on the general meaning of stockman or shepherd and was used in administrative documents of the medieval Serbian state and of the Ottoman Empire in that sense. Janković (1961): 33 esp. note 35, citing Daničić (1962): 131–3, s.v. *vlah*, says (my translation): 'Roman, a man of the ancient Roman settlements (and) the neighboring regions, and occasionally also a man from Dubrovnik, but by the principal occupation of the first of these and all who work with

a special social role both in the medieval Serbian empire and also in the Ottoman.

The social organization of Vlachs in medieval Serbia was distinct from that of agricultural peasants, as was their relation to the state. They lived in relatively independent villages under their own headmen, in contrast to the agricultural serfs, who were known as Serbians (or *meropi*).¹⁸ Vlach villages were called by a special general term, *katun*, rather than the more common *selo*, and were usually only winter villages, the pastoralists spending the summers on high meadows. Generally, stockmen's villages were given particular names different from those applied to agricultural settlements; they were called by lineage names or patronymics. The internal organization of stockmen's villages was probably a lineage organization; it seems likely that a village might have been a local branch of a major lineage (*bratstvo*, fraternity). The head of a village was probably a lineage elder, variously called *knez*, *primićur*, or *čelnik* (prince, first-inscribed, head). The Vlachs were part of the political and economic structure of the medieval state, as were the *meropi*, but their life was freer, and their obligations were lighter than those of the agricultural serfs.¹⁹ The two segments of the population were sharply distinguished from each other in law and forbidden to mingle.²⁰

As the Serbian state crumbled before the Turks, many agricultural serfs fled into the uplands to take up herding and assumed the status of Vlachs. After the fall of the Serbian Despotism (1459), many peasants escaped across the Sava River into Hungarian territory or to the Serbian interior uplands, and the process of depopulation was accelerated by the depredations of the Hungarian army under Mathias Corvinus. *There was then a massive repopulation of the area by Vlachs, just as there was by peasant-pastoralists in the wake of the Turkish retreat four centuries later.* Djurdjev gives the number of Vlach houses in the Sandžak of Smederevo in 1476 as 7,600 but says that by 1516 the number had climbed to about 12,000. Most of the Vlachs came from the area now known as Stari Vlah (Old Vlach) in extreme western Serbia, from the middle reaches of the

cattle, *pecuarius*; this last meaning occurs most frequently and foremost.' See also Miklosich (1963): 68, Daničić (1962): 131–3, and Onions, ed., *The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology* (1966): 999, s.v. *Welsh*.

¹⁸ Jiriček (1912) pt. 1: 69 suggests that the origin of the word *Serb* lies in an old root meaning 'sharecropper,' citing Russian, Lithuanian, and Greek cognates.

¹⁹ Janković (1961): 33–4; Jiriček (1912) pt. 1: 69–70. For a general description of social organization among agricultural peasants and shepherds, see Jiriček (1912) pt. 1: 24–42.

²⁰ Article 82 of the Code of the Emperor Stefan Dušan, promulgated in the middle of the fourteenth century, reads: 'If a Vlach or Albanian settles down in a village, others should not settle there or follow after him. If he stays by force, he must pay damages and for what his stock have pastured.' (*Gde prestoi Vlah ili Arbanasin na sele, na tom-zi sele da ne prestoi drugi grede za nimi. Ako li po sile stane, da plati potku i što je ispasal* [Janković (1961): 137; Radojčić (1960): 58, 112].) Similarly, intermarriage was discouraged. One of the Dečanska chrysobulls (1330–6) reads: 'A Serb (*viz.* an agricultural serf) must not marry among the Vlachs; if he does, he must bring her into the *meropi*.' (*Srbini da se ne ženi u vlaseh; ako li se oženi, da ju vede u merophe.*) See Janković (1961): 103.

Drina, from Hercegovina, or from the Montenegrin Brda, classic areas of pastoralism and of lineage organization. They were attracted by open land and by the extraordinary privileges held out to them by Turkish administrators who wished to have the land resettled to increase tax income and to provide better defense against the Hungarians. The Vlachs continued to have their own village headmen and developed a feudal-like structure in which district headmen often assumed the position of *spahis* (military vassals) under the sultan. Their mobility was honored, the Turkish judges did not intrude on them, and it was for a time even forbidden to question them about conditions in enemy territory they might have visited in their pastoral wanderings. Their economic position was also superior to that in medieval Serbia, since their feudal dues and work obligations were less. If they settled on Turkish feudal land, they paid only half the tithe normally charged to ordinary peasants. They were permitted to pay some of their dues in money, were completely free of any corvée obligations, and paid a house tax rather than an individual tax. Even the agricultural peasants were relatively less burdened in the Sandžak of Smederevo than in other areas, as an enticement to remain. By 1536, however, the Turks had secured southern Hungary (the Banat) and firmed their general position for the later advance on Vienna. They had no need of generous enticements, and the differences in administrative treatment of Vlachs and agriculturalists were eliminated.²¹

The Census of 1528 thus falls in a period of forced-draft migration and rapid social change. Many Vlachs were probably still moving into the area, but the Turkish attitude toward them had probably already begun to change, perhaps as early as the Ottoman conquest of Belgrade in 1521 or the success in the battle of Mohacs in 1526. Some Vlachs may have been moving into villages deserted by others, and all of them would have experienced some changes in social organization, probably having adopted a household and village organization that still retained internal aspects of the patrilocal and virifocal local groups of the mountain homeland but that had acculturated in part to the external demands of the Turkish bureaucracy and feudal economy. When we add to this general ferment and movement the fact that even settled Vlachs shifted their position naturally with the seasons and perhaps over a cycle of several years, it is small wonder that successive censuses of the same area were not in perfect accord.

IV. THE CENSUSES OF BELGRADE COUNTY, 1528 AND 1530

Two of the censuses that were printed by Šabanović in his collection of historical materials²² are of particular interest for the study of domestic groups in Serbia. Both are tax rolls for villages in the county (*nahija*) of Belgrade. The first is from the *Tahrir defteri* No. 144 in the archives at Istanbul and lacks a date; however,

²¹ The above account is based on Djurdjev in Babić *et al.* (1960): 76–86.

²² Šabanović (1964).

it is similar to and has the same instructional introduction as another document from the same archive, the *Tahrir defteri* No. 1011, which covers a different set of villages in the same sandžak. This further document was dated in the first ten days of Ramadan, 934, that is, from 20 to 29 May, 1528. On the basis of internal evidence, Šabanović judges No. 144 to be a second portion of No. 1011 and slightly later in time, but still in the same year (1528). That means that No. 144 was probably finally compiled and sent to Istanbul in the summer or fall of 1528; thus, it was very likely to have been assembled in the field in the preceding winter, and perhaps verified in the spring. The precise date of its assembly may be important in its interpretation.

The second census published by Šabanović in 1964 consists of parts of the *Tapu-defteri* No. 978, also from the Istanbul archive. Although it lacks a date, it is attributed to the period after 1527 because it contains the name of an official, referred to as deceased, who is known to have died in that year. Further, it refers to the Vlachs of the city of Smederevo as 'former' or 'derogated' Vlachs, while the *Tahrir defteri* No. 144 described above, refers to them simply as Vlachs. Since withdrawal of privileges from the Vlachs of the region was probably just beginning, and since No. 144 cannot be earlier than 1528, No. 978 must be later than 1528. The next dated census of the sandžak was taken in 1536, by which time the removal of privileges from the Vlachs was an accomplished fact. Šabanović attributes No. 978 to the period 1528–32, certainly before 1536, and probably in 1528–30. To avoid confusion, I refer throughout to the second census as the Census of 1530.

The two Censuses, of 1528 and 1530, differ markedly in their internal construction and apparent purpose. Because the format of the 1528 Census is critical to its interpretation and analysis, I have transcribed Šabanović's listing for a single small village (Tatarin) in 1528 and further to illustrate the differences have translated that listing and its equivalent for the Census of 1530.²³ The Serbo-Croatian text on Tatarin for 1528 is as follows:

Jovan sin Božidara i s njim: Vuk, njegov sin; Petar, njegov sin; Dragoje, njegov sin.
Božidar sin Vukmana i s njim: Dobrica, njegov brat; Petar, njegov sin; Radul, njegov sin; Cvetko, njegov bratcućed.

Radavac sin Vukmana.

Radovan sin Vukašina i s njim: Vuk, njegov brat.

Bora sin Milašina i s njim: Vuk, njegov sin.

Radosav sin Radošina i s njim: Radošin, njegov otac.

Radoje sin Rajčića.

Vuk sin Dragobrata i s njim Radosav, njegov brat.²⁴

DOMOVA 8, TABIJA 11.

The English translation of this list for Tatarin and, in parallel, of the list for Tatarin in 1530 are as follows:

²³ See Šabanović (1964): 47–8, 132.

²⁴ See below, p. 360 fn. 32.

(1528)	(1530)
Jovan the son of Božidar and with him: Vuk, his son; Petar, his son; Dragoje, his son.	Jovan the son of Božidar Radivoj the son of Jovan Petar the son of Jovan Cvetko the son of Dobrica Radovan the son of Vukašin Boža the son of Milašin Vuk the son of Djura, unknown Jakša the son of Radoje Božidar the son of Vukman Radul the son of Božidar Dobrica the son of Vukman Radul the son of Božidar Dobrica the son of Vukman Mihail the son of Vučko Milić the son of Radonja Vukodrag the son of Janko Vuk the son of Dragobrat Radosav the son of Dragobrat
Božidar the son of Vukman and with him: Dobrica, his brother; Petar, his son; Radul, his son; Cvetko, his fraternal nephew.	
Radavac the son of Vukman.	
Radovan the son of Vukašin and with him: Vuk, his brother.	
Bora the son of Milašin and with him: Vuk, his son.	
Radosav the son of Radošin and with him: Radošin, his father.	
Radoje the son of Rajčić.	
Vuk the son of Dragobrat and with him Radosav, his brother.	

HOUSES 8

CORESIDENT MALES 11²⁵

The evidence for population turnover is again clear in comparison of the lists for 1528 and 1530. By 1530, two men had disappeared from the first family in the 1528 list, one had disappeared from the second, and one from the fifth. The third, sixth, and seventh families had disappeared entirely; only the fourth and eighth were intact. Six men not listed in 1528 were given in 1530; only two of them could possibly have been related to anyone in the list of 1528, on the basis of the evidence given: Radivoj, who might have been the son of Jovan in the first family, and Jakša, who might have been the son of Radoje in the seventh.

Some assumptions have to be made in characterizing the groups in the 1528 list as 'families.' Each group is clearly distinguished from the others in several ways. For example, each group is physically separate from the others in the list; they are not run together. The first person named in any group is almost always a man, whose father is named by way of identification of his son. Of course, the father need not have been present at the time and was frequently, no doubt, already dead. Sometimes the name of the father is found at the head of another

²⁵ 'Coresident males' is my rendering of the word *tabija*. Šabanović gives the etymological source as Arabic *tābi* or *tawābi* (one who follows, one who belongs) and defines it for these documents as all grown males in a household. It is clear from the lists themselves and numbers of 'houses' and of 'coresident males' given at the foot of the lists that the word refers only to those grown males who were not themselves heads of households.

group, and on rare occasions it is found within the same group at the head of which his son's name is given. It sometimes happens that the person named at the beginning of a group listing is a woman, but she is always noted as a widow, and the name of her dead husband is often given by way of identification; he, of course, is not found elsewhere in the list. The names of persons at the beginning of a group listing are always given in the nominative case; the names of identifiers (such as fathers or husbands) are always given in the genitive case in Serbian. The names of persons following the name of the first person in any group are also given in the nominative case and are accompanied by some specification of kinship linkage to the person named first.

Now, it is difficult to imagine any reason for such grouping other than familial relationship and coresidence, in view of all we know about the traditional structure of Serbian households. These groups cannot be sets of men listed together simply because they were related, because some men with the same father are *not* listed together (cf. Božidar and Radavac, both sons of Vukman; it is not likely that there were two dead or absent fathers named Vukman in the immediate genealogy of this tiny village). Further, this method of listing coresident adult males (and widows if they were heads of households) seems to have been traditional at least from medieval times until the present (see below), and such groups have always been interpreted as coresident by Yugoslav scholars.

It is true that the original documents themselves do not specify the groups as coresident in any explicit way, but²⁶ using Occam's razor, it seems unnecessary to invent far-fetched reasons for their grouping other than coresidence. I have therefore interpreted each of the groups in the 1528 Census as a set of coresident adult males (with some widows, as noted, sometimes with immature sons, as described below), each male related in a specific way to the person first-named, who is taken as the head of the group. Since it cannot be supposed that these men lived together without women, and since women other than household heads are not named in the source, I propose to call these blocks of males (with occasional female heads) *work groups*. The purpose of what now follows is to convert these work groups into *households* where each first-named person becomes a household head.

Before we proceed to this work of conversion it may be noted that the listing of 1530, although in many ways less useful than that of 1528, contains evidence which gives crucial assistance to the undertaking. The document of 1530 differs from that of 1528 in that all males are named separately with the names of their fathers given; it does not even place brothers in adjacent position on the list. Nevertheless, it gives some information absent in the 1528 list – data on taxes and on the total number of unmarried males. The reasons for these differences are obscure. It is conceivable that, if the 1528 Census had been taken in the fall or winter, the Vlachs would have been gathered in their winter houses in the

²⁶ Cf. the households analysed by Laslett and Clarke, see below, Chapter 15, p. 376, where the specification is explicit in the use of the word *dom*.

katun, under one roof or clustered in adjacent sleeping sheds, just as they are today in upland areas in which a seasonal transhumance still prevails. Census-takers going to the winter villages would probably have listed the men according to the households in which they were then living. On the other hand, if the 1530 Census had been taken in the spring or summer, the Vlachs might have been scattered across the upland pastures or at least in separate cabins of a farmyard or upland hamlet, each nuclear family having its own summer hearth. The purposes of the two censuses may also have been different. The second one clearly demanded a personal tax from each individual male (*ispendža*), for it is possible to recompute the total tax for a village from the standard rates and arrive at the total given in the lists. The first census could well have been a house tax or hearth census, with coresident males other than the head listed for other purposes, perhaps for a population census, a corvée, or a military levy.

V. ANALYSIS OF THE 1528 CENSUS

The groups of coresident adult males which I have called *work groups*, must be regarded as the core sets of agnatically related men, important in production and consumption, and the base on which patrilocal extended and fraternal joint households were formed. The structure of such work groups, however, cannot be assumed to be identical with that of complex households formed by combination of conjugal families, since some undetermined number of men in the work groups of the listing of 1528 were probably not married. If they *were* all married, the frequencies of occurrence of various types of work groups would be an adequate representation of the frequencies of occurrence of various types of households, but merely to assume that they were all married would exaggerate the degree of extension of households. Since the Census of 1530, unlike that of 1528, gives some direct evidence on the proportions of married and unmarried adult males, we may use those data to derive a more conservative picture of the constitution of households, in which each male is taken to be married and the head of a coresident conjugal family.

The summary data in 1530 on the 146 villages present in both the 1528 and 1530 returns show that about 13 % of the *adult* males in 1530 were unmarried. (Immature males were not included in the computation.) If 13 % of the *adult* males were also unmarried in 1528, there would have been 567 of them in all the villages given in that Census. Now, some households may have been headed by unmarried males; this could have happened when a lone unmarried son had left his father, or when unmarried adult brothers lived alone, or with a widowed mother who was not the head of the household, or with unmarried sisters, as might happen if both parents had been killed, leaving a sibling set to fend for itself. Nevertheless, I have assumed for purposes of reconstruction that all heads of households in 1528 were married (or widowed). Thus, the 567 unmarried males would have been found only among the 2,636 coresident *adult* males who

were not household heads, namely among the *tabije*. Under this assumption, 22 % of the *tabije* would have been unmarried. In all of this, it should be noted that the proportion of unmarried males is assumed to have been the same in 1528 as in 1530, and that the computations are restricted to households headed by males and to males who are not indicated as immature (*maloletan*) in the returns themselves.

The upshot of all this is that we may take the figure of 22 % as the probability that a *tabija* (a male who was not a household head) was unmarried. More precisely, we would say that the probability that a *tabija* was unmarried was 0.22. For convenience in computation, that probability will be taken as 0.25, or 1 in 4; the use of 0.25 rather than 0.22 as the probability of being unmarried simply gives a more conservative estimate of the extended character of households. If this probability is applied to the data on work groups in the conversion of such groups to extended households in which all the listed men are assumed to be married, the number of men who are not heads diminishes by one-fourth. However, determination of the frequency of occurrence of extended households of particular structural types depends not on the simple, wholesale application of this one-in-four probability but on some slight refinements, in which there must be computed the probability that one *tabija*, two *tabije*, three *tabije*, etc. are all unmarried.

The method of reconstructing *zadrugas* from the distribution of work groups can be illustrated as follows. Suppose, for example, that in some hypothetical Serbian population there occurred but four structural types of work groups or of *zadrugas*, namely:

- (1) A lone man, in the frequency of 100.
- (2) A man and one brother, in the frequency of 200.
- (3) A man and two brothers, in the frequency of 100.
- (4) A man and three brothers, in the frequency of 50.

If these structural types were work groups, it would be irrelevant whether the men in them were married or not. However, if these structural types were *zadrugas*, we would understand that all the men listed in them were married.

Now, in this hypothetical population the true number of *zadrugas* corresponding to the first structural type could not be less than the number of work groups corresponding to that type, since, by definition, all heads of households are (or have been) married. The probability of being unmarried cannot be applied to work groups with only one adult male, so that in this hypothetical population, the number of *zadrugas* of type 1 must be at least 100.

In work groups of the second type, the head of the household must be married, but the 0.25 probability of being unmarried can be applied to the 'extra' brother. Since there are 200 work groups of this type, we should find that on the average one-fourth, or 50, of them would consist of one married brother (the head) and one unmarried brother, so that these 50 would in fact correspond to the structural type given as no. 1, above, in so far as *zadrugas* were concerned. The


remaining 150 would have two married brothers and would thus qualify for inclusion under type 2. Thus, at this point in the reconstruction, the number of zadrugas of type 1 would consist of the 100 work groups of type 1 plus the 50 work groups of type 2 that had been reduced to type 1 by this procedure, a total of 150. By the same token, the 200 work groups of type 2 would have been reduced to only 150.

Passing to work groups of type 3, the probability that two of the brothers who are not head will be unmarried is $(0.25)^2$ or 0.0625, that one will be married and the other unmarried is $(2)(0.25)(0.75)$ or 0.3750, and that both will be married is $(0.75)^2$ or 0.5625. Since there were 100 work groups of type 3 to begin with, the potential distribution of these is (theoretically) 6.25 to type 1, 37.50 to type 2, while 56.25 continue to qualify for inclusion in type 3. In the fourth type of work group, using the same reasoning, the probability that all three 'extra' brothers will be unmarried is 0.0156, that one will be married and two unmarried is 0.1406, that two will be married and one unmarried 0.4219, and that all three will be married also 0.4219. The original 50 work groups of type four must be then distributed 0.78 to the first type of reconstructed zadruga, 7.03 to the second, 21.10 to the third, while 21.10 remain as zadrugas of the fourth type. The final result of the redistribution in this example can be summarized by comparing the original distribution of work group types to the computed distribution of reconstructed zadrugas (data in percents):

	Type			
	1	2	3	4
Work groups	22.2	44.4	22.2	11.1
Zadrugas	34.9	43.2	17.2	4.7

This process of reconstruction was carried out for each of the 70 types of work groups originally inferred from the census list (see ideographs in Fig. 14.2 opposite).

The procedure for reconstruction is, of course, only a crude one. While all household heads with a coresident son were almost certainly married, some lone males in the list of work groups might have been single; nevertheless, the probability of being unmarried was applied only to nonheads and nonfathers. Further, no attempt was made to specify differential probabilities of being unmarried. There are no direct data on such differences in any of the censuses and no age-specific counts of married or unmarried males. Nevertheless, it is intuitively obvious that a coresident son of the head is more likely to be unmarried than a coresident brother of the head, and that younger brothers are more likely to be unmarried than older brothers. It would be possible to refine the analysis by guessing at these differential probabilities, but the actual differences between the distribution of work group types and types of reconstructed zadrugas are







Fig. 14.2 Types of work groups and reconstructed zadrugas in 1528

slight, so that it is unlikely that further minor refinements would lead to important revisions. Fig. 14.2 and Table 14.1 present the immediate results of the analysis in sufficient detail to permit the reader to utilize other systems of classification and reconstruction.²⁷

The first column of Table 14.1 gives the identifying numbers of the types of work groups and of zadrugas depicted in Fig. 14.2. The second column gives the frequency of each type of work group and the third column the percentage each type constitutes of the total. The fourth column gives the percentage of each type of reconstructed zadruga out of the total of these, and the fifth presents an approximate distribution of expected frequencies of each type of reconstructed zadruga.²⁸ This table, like Tables 14.3 and 14.4, refers only to the Orthodox households in the census. There were 49 households identified as Moslem; the distribution of Moslem work group types is given briefly in Table 14.2, but no attempt was made at reconstruction of zadrugas because the Moslem sample is so small.

Tables 14.3 and 14.4 present summary data on the work groups and reconstructed zadrugas, concerning the sex of household head, mean number of males per work group or zadruga, frequency of inclusion of various kin types, genera-

²⁷ The reliability of these reconstructions is high because of the specificity of the Census; only a few types are ambiguous. In Nos. 48 to 55 I have assumed that all fraternal nephews are brothers *inter se* if there is only one brother of the head in the group or if there is no brother of the head living in the household. If more than one brother and more than one nephew are present, I have divided the nephews as evenly as possible among the brothers. Since there are only 14 such ambiguous cases in 2,002, any distortions introduced are small.

²⁸ In computing the expected frequencies, all values less than one are given as one, so that the total number is inflated to 2,064, but for illustrative purposes the difference is not important.

Table 14.1 *Distribution of work groups and reconstructed extended household types in 1528 (Orthodox only)*

No. ^a	No. of work groups	Percentage of work groups	Percentage of reconstructed households	Expected frequency of reconstructed households
1	551	27.5	37.8	757
2	6	0.2	0.2	4
3	263	13.1	14.1	282
4	135	6.7	5.5	110
5	58	2.9	1.8	36
6	18	0.8	0.4	8
7	3	0.1	0.1	2
8	1	< 0.1	< 0.1	1
9	365	18.2	19.0	380
10	71	3.5	2.9	58
11	23	1.1	0.8	16
12	9	0.4	0.2	4
13	2	0.1	0.1	2
14	170	8.5	6.2	124
15	21	1.0	0.6	12
16	4	0.2	0.1	2
17	1	< 0.1	0.1	2
18	50	2.5	1.4	28
19	5	0.2	0.2	4
20	1	< 0.1	< 0.1	1
21	9	0.4	0.2	4
22	4	0.2	0.1	2
23	1	< 0.1	< 0.1	1
24	9	0.4	0.6	12
25	2	0.1	0.1	2
26	1	< 0.1	< 0.1	1
27	5	0.2	0.2	4
28	1	< 0.1	< 0.1	1
29	2	0.1	0.1	2
30	1	< 0.1	< 0.1	1
31	1	< 0.1	< 0.1	1
32	1	< 0.1	< 0.1	1
33	1	< 0.1	< 0.1	1
34	17	0.8	0.8	16
35	6	0.3	0.3	6
36	6	0.3	0.3	6
37	1	< 0.1	< 0.1	1
38	18	0.8	0.8	16
39	6	0.3	0.3	6
40	3	0.1	0.1	2
41	4	0.2	0.2	4
42	3	0.1	0.1	2
43	1	< 0.1	< 0.1	1
44	1	< 0.1	< 0.1	1
45	2	0.1	0.1	2
46	1	< 0.1	< 0.1	1

Table 14.1 (contd)

No.	No. of work groups	Percentage of work groups	Percentage of reconstructed households	Expected frequency of reconstructed households
47	1	< 0.1	< 0.1	1
48	4	0.2	0.2	4
49	3	0.1	0.1	2
50	1	< 0.1	< 0.1	1
51	1	< 0.1	< 0.1	1
52	1	< 0.1	< 0.1	1
53	1	< 0.1	< 0.1	1
54	2	0.1	0.1	2
55	1	< 0.1	< 0.1	1
56	2	0.1	0.1	2
57	1	< 0.1	< 0.1	1
58	2	0.1	0.1	2
59	1	< 0.1	< 0.1	1
60	1	< 0.1	< 0.1	1
61	1	< 0.1	< 0.1	1
62	5	0.2	0.2	4
63	1	< 0.1	< 0.1	1
64	3	0.1	0.1	2
65	1	< 0.1	< 0.1	1
66	1	< 0.1	< 0.1	1
67	40 (71) ^b	2.0 (3.5)	3.8	79
68	61 (32)	3.0 (1.6)	1.2	24
69	2 (0)	0.1 (0.0)	0.0	0
70	1	< 0.1	0.0	0
	2,002	100.0	100.0	2,064

^a See Fig. 14.2.^b Frequencies and percentages of work groups 67, 68 and 69 *not* in parentheses treat those sons of female heads listed as 'young' (*maloletan*) in the census as though they were old enough to work but too young to be married. Frequencies and percentages of those work groups *in* parentheses treat these same sons as immature and listed in the census only because the household head was a female. The corresponding figures for reconstructed zadrugas are not differentiated because, even under the most liberal interpretation, these sons would not have been married. Subsequent interpretation in Tables 14.3 and 14.4 and in the text employs the more conservative estimates represented here in parentheses.

tional depth, and the distribution of nuclear, lineally extended, laterally extended, and both lineally and laterally extended work groups and reconstructed zadrugas.

Regardless of whether one focuses on the work groups or on the reconstructed zadrugas, several important features of social organization are immediately apparent. First, there are very few inclusions that are not based on some explicit kinship linkage. There are no servants listed in the Census, even in the households of district and village headmen.²⁰ Second, the virifocal and agnatic bias of social

²⁰ Contrast this with Laslett and Clarke's analysis of Belgrade households in 1733, see below, Chapter 15, pp. 379, 387. The 1528 Census shows only 11 coresident males of unspecified relation to the head.

Table 14.2 *Distribution of types of work groups in 1528 (Moslems only)*

No. ^a	Frequency	Percent
1	19	38.7
3	4	8.2
9	15	30.6
10	1	2.0
14	4	8.2
15	1	2.0
34	1	2.0
38	1	2.0
41	1	2.0
67	1	2.0
68	1	2.0
Total	49	99.7

^a See Fig. 14.2.Table 14.3 *Summary data on work groups and extended households in 1528 (Orthodox only)*

Kin or other category ^a	Work groups				Extended households ^c			
	Frequency	Percent of all males	Percent of added males ^b	Per group	Frequency	Percent of all males	Percent of added males ^b	Per household
Brother	1,192	26	45	0.60	964	24	46	0.47
Son	1,094	24	41	0.55	887	22	42	0.43
Brother's son	106	2	4	0.05	98	2	5	0.05
Father	23	< 1	1	0.01	25	< 1	1	0.01
Other kin, misc.	253	6	10	0.13	137	3	6	0.07
Total added males	2,668	58	100	1.33	2,111	52	100	1.02
Male household heads	1,898	42	—	0.95	1,961	48	—	0.92
Total males	4,566	100	—	2.28	4,072	100	—	1.97
Households	2,002	—	—	—	2,064	—	—	—

^a Kinship categories include only brothers, sons, brother's sons, fathers, father's brothers, father's fathers, son's sons, more distant agnates, and unclassifiable persons. Women are not listed unless given as household heads; thus, while dependent fathers are listed, dependent mothers are not, even if widowed. The absence of matri, sorori- or uxorilateral extensions of any kind in the data accounts for the absence of in-marriage sons-in-law, of sororal nephews, and similar kin types (with one exception, no. 70).

^b Added males include all adult males (in work groups) and all married males (in extended households) other than the household head. Thus, the sum of added males and of male household heads is the total number of males, and this sum plus the number of female household heads yields the number of households.

^c Figures for extended households refer to the reconstructed zadrugas in Table 14.1.

Table 14.4 *Principles of work group and extended household organization in 1528*

Generation depth ^b	Work groups		Extended households ^a	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
1	1,232	62	1,383	67
2	756	38	667	32
3	14	1	14	1
Total	2,002	101	2,064	100
Household type, head-centered ^c				
Nonextended	622	31	836	41
Lineally extended	523	26	479	16
Laterally extended	665	33	599	27
Lineally and laterally extended	192	10	150	17
Total	2,002	100	2,064	101
Household type, not head-centered ^c				
Nonextended	622	31	836	41
Lineally extended	307	15	321	16
Laterally extended	610	30	547	27
Lineally and laterally extended	463	23	360	17
Total	2,002	99	2,064	101

^a Figures for extended households refer to the reconstructed zadrugas in Table 14.1.

^b Generation depth refers only to adults listed in the census; thus some of the groups of households in each category would be in the next higher category if unlisted children were included.

^c In classifying head-centered household types, extensions were related strictly to the head. In classifying the same households as non-head-centered, account was taken of the presence of lineal and lateral links to any member of the group or household. Thus, a head plus brother plus brother's son is only laterally extended in a head-centered sense but both lineally and laterally extended in a non-head-centered sense. Note that as in other presentations of the 1528 data no account can be taken of the presence of women who are not household heads, since they are not listed. Many aged mothers, for example, whose presence would make for lineally extended households, are here omitted of necessity.

organization is demonstrated at every point. Women are never heads of households unless they are explicitly listed as widows, and only five percent of the households are of this type; indeed, women are not listed at all unless they are widows. There is only one sororilateral inclusion (No. 70), almost surely an unmarried younger brother living with a widowed sister. All nephews are fraternal. Serbo-Croatian kinship terminology clearly distinguishes fraternal nephews (*bratućed* or *bratić* or *bratanac*) from sororal nephews (*sestrić*), and Šabanović uses only *bratućed*.³⁰ There are, surprisingly, no instances at all of uxorilocal sons-in-law; such inclusions are firmly institutionalized (although

³⁰ Šabanović (1964). It is, of course, possible that the Turkish documents gave the kinship relationship in some form that did not distinguish between fraternal and sororal nephews but that Šabanović used the Serbian *bratućed* as an unmarked lexeme including both fraternal and sororal nephew. There is no simple way to check this possibility, but it is unlikely, since *bratućed* is never used in that way in Serbian, and since there is a perfectly good term, *nećak*, which refers to any nephew but which Šabanović did not use at all.

empirically not common) in modern Serbian peasant life and kinship terminology.³¹ That some kind of extended family organization was the norm is clear from the average number of adult males in work groups or zadrugas, just over two for the former and just under two for the latter.

Table 14.3 shows that the adult males in a work group or zadruga were most often brothers; just under half of all the males other than the head were coresident brothers.³² The sons of household heads account for slightly more than 40 % of the coresident males. There are few relatives of other types included. Fraternal nephews comprise only about five percent of the additional males apart from the household heads, dependent fathers for only about one percent. Finally, all the other types listed in the census (father's father, father's brother, son's son, miscellaneous agnates, and the very rare unclassifiable and perhaps unrelated persons) amount to ten percent of additional males, while in reconstructed zadrugas they amount to only six percent of additional males. Most groups or households, then, must have consisted of a father and his sons, or of his sons after his death, or of some sons gone off together. *The sons did not remain together long enough to accumulate a large number of sons of their own, for the number of adult sons of brothers is very small.*

Other data, in Tables 14.1 and 14.4, confirm the view that the developmental cycle was of relatively shallow depth. Sixty-two percent of the work groups and two-thirds of the zadrugas were only one adult generation deep. Almost all the rest of the groups are but two generations deep. Of course, one would not expect very many households with three adult generations because the eldest persons would very likely die before their grandchildren reached maturity.

³¹ Common terms are *domazet* (house son-in-law), *uljez* (intruder), *mirašćija* (one who comes by marriage into a land dowry). The total absence of in-marrying sons-in-law is not easy to explain. All the census data are 'head-centered,' that is, the kinship relationships are given with respect to the head. An in-marrying son-in-law would be listed as such only if a father had had only daughters and one of them had taken in a husband, and if the father had retained the headship. If a daughter in such circumstances had taken in a husband who had himself assumed the headship, the father would have been listed as *fast* (wife's father), but there are no such entries. It would have been most unusual for a daughter to take in a husband if she had any brothers, but if that had occurred, her husband would have been listed as *zet* (sister's husband); alternatively, if her husband had assumed the headship, any brothers would have been listed as *šurak* (wife's brother). None of these terms occur in the census. An in-marrying son-in-law would have appeared as a lone household head, however, if his wife's father had died without male issue, even if the widow were still alive; thus, there may be some in-marrying males hidden in the census.

³² A further caution on the interpretation of kinship terms concerns the use of the word *brat*. This term can refer both to 'brother' and to 'male first cousin'. Thus, some of the 'brothers' in the census may be cousins, so that the kinship span of the households may be wider than that suggested here. It does not seem likely, however, that *brat* could mean 'cousin' in these data with any frequency. Given the usual patterns of household division, one would expect most cousins to occur in houses still containing their fathers, so that mention of uncles would also be common; nevertheless, there are almost no uncles cited in the data. Most 'brothers' in two-generational households occur where there is only one male of a senior generation, so that they are most likely the sons of one man. This assumption is frequently confirmed in comparison of the village lists from 1528 with those of 1530, in which males listed as 'brothers' in 1528 are seen to have the same father in 1530.

Some 31 % of the work groups and 41 % of the zadrugas were not extended at all, having only a single male; some of these may even have been without wives, for the census did not list wives, a few may have been caring for unmarried sisters or widowed mothers, but most of them probably were married.³³ Lateral extensions from the head of the group or of the zadruga were more important than lineal extensions. Since sons seldom would have succeeded to the headship of an extended household while their father lived (note the small number of dependent fathers), and since their own sons would not have been listed in the census until perhaps eighteen years after their own adulthood, there is another implication that the developmental cycle was shallow, brothers leaving their parental home as their own sons approached maturity, or that fathers died relatively young, or both. The importance of lateral extensions is even clearer when extensions are viewed with respect to the unit as a whole, rather than just with respect to the head. Many of the 'lineal' extensions with respect to the head are both lineal and lateral, from the standpoint of the entire household, because such lineal extensions were often to more than one son, who were themselves laterally linked. It must be stressed that the particular conformation of these households is very much a function of demographic factors, particularly of age structure and life expectancy. Halpern's work³⁴ points out very clearly that recent lineal extensions of the household depend on increased life expectancy. Age at marriage must also have been crucial because of its effect on fertility; a lower age at marriage for women would increase the rapidity with which constituent nuclear families had children and probably the rapidity with which disputes forced them to divide from one another. Even patterns of nursing, in their effect on the spacing of children, would have been important in the rapidity with which any family built up a sibling core and in the rapidity with which that core dissolved. Unfortunately, no age-specific data on such matters are available to assist in the analysis, so that these effects must remain speculative.

The size of these joint households, in a presumably classic period of Serbian social organization, is also of interest. They were not very large, and only about a quarter of them showed a complexity greater than that of a father with his sons or of two brothers. Later comments will show that the zadruga of 1528 was almost identical in this respect with that of the fourteenth century. Unfortunately, the census data do not give direct information on the total size of households, but average size can be estimated from the data, given a few assumptions. A conservative estimate of sibling net size can be obtained from the 1528 Census by assuming that all brothers remained together permanently, so that a lone household head or a lone son is assumed to have been an only child, a household

³³ Division of an extended household could be delayed for many years if the moral authority of a widowed mother remained strong, or if there were enough younger siblings to require that the full complement of older brothers stayed together on the same farm.

³⁴ Halpern and Anderson (1970).

head living with one brother, or two sons of one man are assumed to have come from a sibling set of only two brothers, and so on. On this basis, the smallest possible average number of brothers surviving to adulthood is about 1.5. A more generous estimate can be reached by counting only those males who are clearly members of a sibling set of at least two – all the men with at least one coresident brother. This estimate is about 2.5. Both estimates ignore any males who died before reaching adulthood, or who might have moved away, or who were still immature, so that the truest estimate is probably closer to the second figure. If the average number of sons per father was 1.5, mean household size would have been around nine; an average of between nine and eleven persons³⁵ per household would fit well with the structural data, households consisting generally of a father and one married son or two married brothers, or perhaps of a father and two sons or three married brothers. Although our knowledge of demographic conditions does not suffice to make precise comparisons, rough estimates based on vital rates in the 1930s and on ethnographic sources of the late nineteenth century all suggest adult fraternal sets of about 1.5–2.0 and mean household sizes of about 9–11. Thus the data from 1528 do not appear exceptional.

VI. COMPARATIVE DATA

Comparative information from the fourteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries throws further light on the problem of interpretation. One of the most perceptive students of traditional Serbian social organization, Novaković,³⁶ has provided a summary of data from the medieval period and the nineteenth century. Information on the last century is also supplemented by the work of Bogišić³⁷ who undertook extensive surveys in the course of his studies of customary law. Information for the twentieth century is scattered and of uneven quality, but there are some good sources, particularly a detailed analysis of change in the *zadruga* from 1863 to the present in a single village, by Halpern and Anderson.³⁸

FOURTEENTH CENTURY

Novaković relies principally on the Dečanska chrysobull of 1330, the Arhandjelska of 1348–53, that of Sveti Stefan in 1313–18, and the Hilandarska of the reign of King Milutin. In general, of the 2,000 houses listed in the Dečanska chrysobull, the majority of *large* extended households fell in the range of 7 to 11

³⁵ Halpern, see below, Chapter 16, p. 406, found a ratio of 1.5 sons (of all ages) per household head for five Serbian villages in the nineteenth century. Mean household size was only 6.7. See also below, pp. 365–368. For a discussion of the wider issues involved in such estimates, see above, Goody, Chapter 3, p. 111 and Burch, Chapter 2 p. 102.

³⁶ Novaković (1891).

³⁷ Bogišić (1874).

³⁸ Halpern and Anderson (1970).

adult males, a few having 13 to 16, and only one reaching 20. One household of 13 adult males is shown to consist of about 30 persons in all.³⁹ If this ratio of 2.3 coresidents per adult male ($30 \div 13 = 2.3$) is a fair average, the size range of the typical *large* *zadruga* would have been 16 to 25 persons. (However, Mijatović's⁴⁰ estimate would yield a higher figure.) Vlach houses are said to be smaller than those of agricultural peasants, and the *zadruga* in general is described as stronger than in modern times (i.e. late nineteenth century) but still modest in size, with great size occasioned more by exceptional fertility than by structural extension, the structure lying within narrow bounds of kinship. Novaković goes on to furnish a sample of household descriptions from chrysobulls and to give a statistical summary in which he lists the total number of houses and the number of these that were 'strong'.⁴¹ A 'strong' house is defined here (and by implication elsewhere in his work) as one that contained more than two brothers. All others were judged 'weak,' that is, those having only two brothers or one married man with or without children, adult or not. Clearly, Novaković omits a large number of joint families with only two brothers and a large number of patrilocal extended families in which a father and several grown sons (at least two of which might be married under this imprecise definition) would live and work together (cf. the data from 1528). One can compute from his data the following results: agricultural serfs in the Dečanska chrysobull had 16 % strong houses, in the Arhandjelska 26 %, and overall 17 %. Vlachs, who are claimed to have had a weaker tradition of the *zadruga*, surprisingly had 30 % strong houses in the Dečanska chrysobull, 47 % in the Arhandjelska, 12 % in that of Sveti Stefan, and overall 28 %. (By way of comparison, the Vlachs of Smederevo in 1528 had 24 % strong houses.) There is evidence for great variability in family structure, and the interpretations are inconsistent.⁴²

Janković,⁴³ noting Novaković's assertion that the *zadruga* must have been very weak among the Vlachs, but not having checked it against the data, goes on to conclude in general that, 'This process of dissolution, the division of large houses, which Novaković has confirmed, was surely fundamentally occasioned by the strengthening of private property and of money economy, especially in the fourteenth century.'⁴⁴ Janković ignores Novaković's own major argument, namely, that the process of individualization cannot have been an important

³⁹ Novaković (1891): 230 ff.

⁴⁰ Mijatović (1948): 64–5, 66–9.

⁴¹ Novaković (1891): 235 ff.

⁴² It would be a mistake, however, to assume territorial homogeneity in the fourteenth century. In particular, the areas bordering on present-day Bulgaria and Greece can be expected to have been different. My own analysis of the chrysobull of Hilandar, to be published separately, shows that nuclear (that is, nonextended and nonjoint) families constituted 80 % of the total. 'Zadruga' organization was quite rare. The villages in this chrysobull were in the Strumica region of extreme southeastern Yugoslavia, only 25 km. from the modern Greek border, and their inhabitants may well have been Greek. See Stojanović (1890): 40–5 and Hammel, *Household structure in fourteenth-century Macedonia* (typescript).

⁴³ Janković (1961).

⁴⁴ Janković (1961): 101–2. Jiriček (1952): 52, interprets Novaković more cautiously and suggests war, skirmishes, pillage, famine and plague as reasons for lower population levels.

factor in the fourteenth century but that the constraints on household organization must be sought in taxation practices and other aspects of the power relationships between feudal lords and their serfs.⁴⁵ Novaković, and indeed, Janković following him, provide some insights into these relationships.

Beginning with citation of Roman and Byzantine practice in levying a household tax (applied also in Bosnia to exactions by the Church and by the Turks and later called *dimina*, *dimnica*, from *dim*, smoke), Novaković goes on to demonstrate by extensive citation from proclamations and legal codes that some labor obligations were assessed *per capita* (such as haying, reaping), while others were assessed by household (such as plowing in many cases, or the transport of salt by Vlachs). It was clearly to the advantage of a family of serfs to live as long as possible under one roof to minimize the impact of household assessments, for several adult men in one household could take their turn at fulfilling the obligation, while a lone man would have to meet each such obligation. By remaining together, a set of coresident brothers could force household obligations to fall on other sets of brothers. A variety of proclamations attest to the interest of the state in forcing division of households in order to increase the available labor pool for household assessments and to the subterfuges employed by the serfs to appear undivided when they had in fact split.⁴⁶

Although precise data are not available without intensive re-analysis of the medieval documents, it seems likely that household size was 'artificially' inflated in the fourteenth century. Novaković's judgment is that medieval times were not favorable to the *zadruga*, because of all the state regulations demanding division.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ See Novaković (1891): 213–14.

⁴⁶ Article 70 of the Code of Stefan Dušan reads: 'And whoever is located in a single house, whether brothers (first cousins) or father and sons, or others, divided in bread and property, even if they have one hearth, but it is divided, let them work as other minor [unincorporated] people' (*I kto se obrete u jednoj kući, ili bratenci, ili otac ot sinov, ili in kto odelan hlebom i imanjem, i ako bude na jednom ognjištu, a tem-zi odelen, da rabota[ju] i ako ini mali ljudije*), Radojčić (1960): 56, 109; Janković (1961): 102. Further, a directive of King Vladislav in the chrysobull of Bistrica (1234–43) reads: 'A married son may live with his father three years; at the end of three years let him leave and go into (his own) personal service to the church' (*I sin s ocem da sedi, oženiv se, tri godišta; kon treh godišta da postupa u osobnu rabotu crkvi* . . .), Janković (1961): 102. The state used carrot as well as stick, the chrysobull of Sveti Stefan reading: 'Those who have no sons or brothers or workers, single men, let two of them reinforce each other if they have various work in the field, but for other work such as plowing and the vineyard, let them go separately. The same holds for estate servants and any artisans' (*I koji ne imaju sina ili brata ili radotnika, jedinaci, dva da se stišteta, ako i raznu rabotu u zemlju imata, nj na ine rabote, a oranije i vinograd razno. Takožde i sokalnici i koji ljubo majstorije*), Novaković (1891): 226. That the Turks continued these practices, as heirs to the heirs of Byzantium, can be seen in a *ferman* of 1766: 'If some of the Christians wish to live in cooperation, themselves electing a person for head of their whole family or *zadruga*, whether that is at the time of tax assessment or prior to it, there is no need to interfere with their wish, provided only that the taxes they pay are not thereby diminished' (*Ako neki od hrišćana požeše živeti u zadrugi, izabравši sebi jedno lice za starešinu svekolike porodice ili zadrugu njihove, pa bilo to u vreme zbora mirije ili pre toga, ne treba smetati njihovoj želji samo ako se time ne smanjavaju prihodi koje oni plaćaju*), Novaković (1891): 215.

⁴⁷ Similarly, Tomasevich (1955): 188 suggests that the nineteenth century was also unfavorable to the *zadruga*, because of the shift to predominantly crop-type agriculture and the influences

However, my faith lies more with peasant ability to dissemble, and it seems equally reasonable to assume that the pressure of tax demands forced the peasants to remain in larger establishments, against which the various proclamations were only partially effective. That Vlach houses appear somewhat larger (or at least that 'strong' houses appear more frequently among them) may result from the fact that they, too, had labor obligations on a per-household basis (such as salt transport or special military duties) but were more scattered and less subject to state control. Household size among the serfs would have been a compromise between the advantages of continued joint residence, state pressure to divide, and the ordinary pressures for fission from within a household. Household size among the Vlachs would have been a similar compromise, complicated by further pressures for and ease of division inherent in pastoralism, but also by more recent cultural traditions of patrilineal organization that might have led to larger households when the Vlachs moved from herding on barren karstic uplands down to more fertile bottom lands to engage in mixed farming. Similar conditions probably prevailed for Vlach households around 1500 in the Sandžak of Smederevo, with inflation of household size increased by the advantages of the hearth tax and the possibility of concealing their domestic arrangements from the Turks, whose judges were initially forbidden to go among them.

NINETEENTH CENTURY

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of data on the *zadruga* in the nineteenth century is the degree of apparent conflict in the reports. Novaković found complaints that the largest *zadrugas* were usually composed of only two or three brothers, and that brothers usually divided when one of them married.⁴⁸ Ivanović in 1853 in the Krajina had observed Serbian households of only five or six persons and Vlach houses of only four or five from which Novaković again concluded that the Vlachs more easily divided their *zadrugas*.⁴⁹ He notes a report of the Archimandrite Dučić that there were no 'zadrugas' at all in Montenegro where brothers rarely stayed together after the death of their father.⁵⁰ From his summary of Mišković's research in the Rudnik area in 1875, it is possible to compute that in 17 settlements there were 1,103 houses with 1,453 adult males, or 1.3 adult males per household.⁵¹ Comparing and summarizing the work of A. S. Jovanović and of K. Jovanović in the 1870s, Novaković provides data from which one may calculate that in four counties of the Valjevo area there were 12,788 taxable persons, of whom 306 lived in 70 *zadrugas*. Thus, the 'zadrugas'

of out-migration and money. However, the nineteenth-century agricultural *zadrugas* must have been larger than the contemporary pastoral ones of the karst, and I know of no firm evidence on agricultural *zadrugas* in Serbia of the late eighteenth century with which to compare those of the nineteenth.

⁴⁸ Novaković (1891): 205–6, citing Milišević.

⁴⁹ Ibid.: 207.

⁵⁰ Ibid.: 208.

⁵¹ Ibid.: 208–9.

(presumably 'strong' houses only) would have had 4.4 adult males each, but only 2.4 % of the taxable persons would have been living in such zadrugas.⁵² Obradović, on the other hand, had observed many houses with six or seven married men, totalling 50 or 60 persons, sometimes fathers with nine to twelve sons, mostly married, in the Užice area in 1858.⁵³ Jovanović had given information on the Podrinje, citing a zadruga with 80 members, and another case on the upper Morava in which a large zadruga had divided itself into 20 separate houses to constitute a whole hamlet of 80 persons. In still another instance, one zadruga was reported to have divided into 13 separate houses, and in a fourth case, in Kopaonik, six brothers were reported to live in a single household sheltering 45 persons, using 128 kilograms of wheat every three days, and in winter requiring three fires and three dining tables.⁵⁴ Novaković also cites an Austrian complaint of 1718 that a father and two or three sons, sometimes married, often lived together and reported as though they were a single tax unit.⁵⁵ Bogišić's detailed reports⁵⁶ give maxima of about 20 to 40 persons, with some houses as large as 60, but with most houses having about 6 to 10 persons in all, in Hercegovina, Montenegro, and western and southern Serbia.

The nineteenth-century data indicate that there was a great variation in household composition and size. Although the data do not lend themselves to precise statistical interpretation, it seems clear that zadrugas of this period, like those of earlier years, were not enormous but usually of modest size, the larger usually falling in the range of 9 to 15 persons in all, with rare exceptions. Seldom did the zadrugas include males other than fathers and sons, or brothers, or occasionally nephews and uncles.

TWENTIETH CENTURY

From the structural point of view taken above, there are surprisingly few differences between the patterns common in the fourteenth, sixteenth, and nineteenth centuries and those more recently observed. The most spectacular examples of joint households in this century have been noted among Albanian speakers (Šiptari) in the region of Kosovo and Metohija. According to Krasnići,⁵⁷ zadrugas of 20 to 30 members were not uncommon, and households of as many as 80 persons were occasionally found. Nikolić⁵⁸ also observes that Serbian zadrugas of 20 to 30 members were found in that area in the 1930s. However, the more recent work of Radovanović⁵⁹ in the area of Prizrenski Podgor (Metohija) shows that even with the occurrence of many large households of the kind just referred to, *average* household size is still relatively modest. In 1953, 47 % of the agricultural population and 41 % of the total population of Prizrenski Podgor

lived in 'zadrugas' that averaged 12.6 members each. Of the zadrugas 17 % had more than 25 members, but the larger ones were usually Šiptar. Since these census materials make the usual categorical distinction between zadrugas and conjugal or even patrilocal extended households, ignoring their developmental possibilities, the average of 12.6 members per zadruga gives a false picture of household size. Less than half the population of Prizrenski Podgor lived in zadrugas, and average household size for the entire population, in this area remarkable for its extended households, was only 7.2 members.

In less spectacular areas studied by Filipović and Pantelić⁶⁰ (Bosnia and Western Serbia), Serbian zadrugas had an average of 8 or 10 members, but these figures again refer only to extended households. Pantelić's data show that the average size for all households in Jadar (Podrinje) was 6.7 in 1895, 6.7 for village households and 6.4 overall in 1900, 5.4 overall in 1948, and 4.3 overall in 1961. Some of the decrease in mean household size is attributable to rapid urbanization; Pantelić notes that upland villages have preserved the zadruga tradition better than those in the bottom lands and closer to large towns, and that some quite large zadrugas persisted into the 1950s. My own research in that area⁶¹ shows that some zadrugas still persist in concealed form; peasants may divide their households officially to allow each segment to acquire the maximum of land permitted by law but still farm jointly. The 1961 Census⁶² for the area of Loznica (Podrinje), with the two major towns eliminated, shows a mean household size of 4.7, slightly higher than Pantelić's uncorrected calculation. In those same villages, using a definition of 'strong' household most likely to coincide with Novaković's, namely, more than 6 members, we find that 20 % of households are 'strong.' In the adjacent area of Mali Zvornik, eliminating the town, 32 % of households are 'strong', and in a culturally similar area, Arilje (near Užice), 21 % of village households are 'strong.' These proportions of large households differ scarcely at all from those found in Novaković's analyses of the fourteenth-century materials, or from the data of the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. Other data support this view of consistency of averages over time, combined with great range: a survey of peasant properties⁶³ across the entire country shows an average size of 6.1 persons per agricultural household, even though the small-family areas of Slovenia and Croatia are included, as well as the exceptional ones of Kosovo and Metohija. Average household size for the country as a whole is only 4.0, but means as high as 9.5 are reported for some parts of Kosovo and Metohija.

The most detailed examination of household size and constitution is that by Halpern and Anderson.⁶⁴ Direct comparison between their data and those of the 1528 Census is difficult because of the different data formats and because the level of aggregation in their analysis is too high to permit recasting. Nevertheless,

⁵² Ibid.: 210.

⁵³ Ibid.: 207.

⁵⁴ Bogišić (1874).

⁵⁵ Nikolić (1958).

⁵⁶ Ibid.: 206.

⁵⁷ Ibid.: 208.

⁵⁸ Krasnići (1959-60).

⁵⁹ Radovanović (1964).

⁶⁰ Filipović (1945); Pantelić (1964).

⁶¹ Hammel (1968).

⁶² Yugoslavia (1964) Table 5.1.

⁶³ Yugoslavia (1965).

⁶⁴ Halpern and Anderson (1970).

some useful comparisons can be attempted. Their data show that mean household size in the village of Orašac (Šumadija) was 8.3 in 1844 and 1863, fell to 6.9 in 1895 (cf. 6.7 in Jadar, above), and to 4.5 in 1961 (cf. 4.7 in the villages around Loznica, above). Computation from their data of the proportion of 'strong' households (i.e. with more than six members) yields a very high 66 % in 1863, 27 % in 1928, and 14 % in 1961. The percentage of large households in Orašac is thus now lower than in the areas of Loznica, Mali Zvornik, and Arilje cited earlier, perhaps because these areas are in the conservative uplands of western Serbia, while Orašac is closer to the heart of Serbia.

Halpern and Anderson point out, however, that measures of household size and shifts in them obscure manifold structural changes. Indeed, readily available and simple statistical or classificatory criteria (such as mean household size or rigid distinctions between extended and nonextended families) often demonstrate a marked disutility for careful comparison between areas or over time. Dependence on them results in serious disagreement, as illustrated in the innumerable disputes over residence and kinship classifications⁶⁵ or marked loss of information in analysis.⁶⁶ One of Halpern and Anderson's major points is that a marked shift from lateral to lineal extension occurred between 1863 and the present, because of lowered mortality and an ageing population, a lower birth rate that provided fewer siblings per family, and the abandonment of rural life by many sons. In other words, the reduction in mean household size was underlain by a shift from the classic *zadruga* form of patrilocal and fraternal extension toward the stem family pattern in which only a single son usually remains on the land. It is important to note that the causal factors in this change involve no major shift in the basic ideology of kinship but only the response of behavioral patterns to demographic and ecological alterations.⁶⁷

Some further structural comparisons can be made between Orašac and the Vlachs of Smederevo. Halpern and Anderson's categories of single-person households, married couples without children, widowed persons without lineal or lateral extension, and nuclear families would have fallen into that set of the 1528 data labelled 'nonextended.' Orašac had 36 % of its families in this category in 1863 and 42 % in 1961. The comparable category among the Vlachs in 1528 contained 41 %, squarely within the Orašac range. The differences between Orašac and the Vlachs of 1528 lie in the *kinds* of extensions. Halpern and Anderson provide data on the numbers of brothers and sons in Orašac households, and their table of age distributions permits one to compute the number of coresident brothers and sons over the age of nineteen. If we assume that these men would be equivalent to those defined as adult coresident males in the Ottoman Census of 1528, Orašac had 0.34 brothers and 0.45 sons per household in 1863 and 0.02 brothers and 0.45 sons per household in 1961. Because unmarried

men are included in these data, the comparable figures from 1528 are those for work groups: 0.60 brothers and 0.55 sons. Although Orašac had a mean household size in 1863 close to that estimated for the 1528 Census, it had many fewer adult brothers per household. The large size of its houses must have been a consequence of very high fertility (probably at or above 40 per 1,000), resulting in households with relatively few coresident adult married brothers, some married sons, and many small children.⁶⁸ These differences between Orašac of 1863 and Belgrade County in 1528 would be diminished if there were age-specific data available in the 1528 Census or if Halpern and Anderson's tables permitted the identification of males aged 16 to 18. If males aged 16 to 18, doubtless considered adult in 1528, were added to the coresident adult males in these recomputations of the Orašac data, the number of brothers and sons would increase. If males aged less than nineteen could be removed from the 1528 data, the number of coresident brothers and sons would decrease; in either case, the gap between Orašac and the Vlachs of 1528 would be narrowed.

SUMMARY OF COMPARATIVE DATA

Several points are of interest: (1) variation between areas is very great and is at least equal to that over time; (2) average household size has changed less than one might expect from the funereal remarks made about the *zadruga*, and it is not a very instructive indicator unless complemented by structural data and information on demographic rates; (3) the basic structural principles of household organization have changed very little over time. Even unusual households, such as one described by Radovanović,⁶⁹ are structured along well-defined agnatic lines: the household of Bajram Bujari contained 60 persons in 1958 but all (except of course the wives) were descended from Bajram's own grandfather. The most distantly related adult males were second cousins. The smaller households described by Halpern and Anderson demonstrate the same structural principles under different constraints, of longer life span but truncated developmental cycle, yielding patrilocal and virifocal households of narrower and longer kinship span, with fraternal ties giving way to minimal filial ones.

⁶⁸ The population of Serbia tripled between 1840 and 1900, largely as a result of migration and territorial expansion, although the birth rate was probably at least 40 per 1,000 in the earlier years of the century. The pressure of the population on the land must have been enormous; indeed, it was the beginning of the process that led to serious overpopulation in the twentieth century. Much of the increase was made possible by the introduction of new crops and a shift to grain cultivation, and particularly by the adoption of maize, which will support more people per hectare than wheat or barley. Maize was not introduced to most areas of Serbia until well into the eighteenth century and did not reach some until the nineteenth. See Tomasevich (1955): 151 ff., on population, and Lutovac (1936) and Tomasevich (1955): 163-4 on the introduction of maize. It is quite possible that the high levels of mean household size in some parts of Serbia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were a direct result of the introduction of maize and adoption of intensive methods of cultivation requiring a large labor force in a small area.

⁶⁹ Radovanović (1964): 368.

⁶⁵ Goodenough, *Residence Rules* (1956); Fischer, *The classification of residence in censuses* (1958); Lounsbury (1964).

⁶⁶ Hammel, *Occupational prestige in Belgrade* (1970).

⁶⁷ Hammel (1969 i) and (1969 ii).

VII. CONCLUSIONS

What is most evident from all of these data is that the *zadruga* is not a thing but a process.⁷⁰ Separation of a process into snapshots of its behavior leads only to misinterpretation and the computation of misleading indices, such as simple means of household size, frequency of division of households, or the size of only the largest units, as in the repeated citation of answers to the query, 'How big were the biggest households?' The *zadruga*, as a process, is a set of rules operating within certain constraints that influence the rates at which persons are added to residential groups and that control the maximum size of these groups by introducing pressures for continued accretion or for division. The intensity of accretion is determined largely by demographic rates under a rule of patrilocal residence. That rule can be taken as a constant for traditional Serbian social organization (unless a man has no sons), and the correspondence between the frequency of large houses and high birth rates among Albanian speakers in Kosovo and Metohija, or among Serbs in the nineteenth century can be no accident. A father who has had four sons live to adulthood and marriage, each of whom has four small children, could easily find himself master of a household of 26 persons: a wife, four sons, four daughters-in-law, and 16 grandchildren. If he had married as early as the age of twenty and had had his first son a year later, and then a child every second year, and if his sons had married equally early, this patriarch of almost Biblical proportions would have been but fifty-seven years old on the birth of his sixteenth grandchild. Families of ten living children are not unknown in these regions, and a bias in the sex ratio could create a house of enormous size in only two adult generations, while the father's authority was still strong enough to keep the sons together.

The pressures for continued accretion and the constraints on it are various. Pastoralism, soil that is poor but abundant, warfare and feud that encourage mobility for flight, and effective state pressure for division will lower household size. The smaller size of Montenegrin families in earlier years and even today is a consequence of their poverty, pastoralism, poor soil, and frequent fission because of feud and flight. Limitation in recent years of the amount of land that may be owned by one household has certainly stimulated the division of modern Serbian farm households. On the other hand, the limited availability of land or other economic opportunity, combined with natural increase, will increase the size of households, for the children have nowhere else to go. The adoption of

⁷⁰ Jiriček's view through the mists of romanticism was refreshingly clear. In commenting on the small families characteristic of barren Montenegro, he wrote (my translation): 'That small family could always enlarge under favorable circumstances. Too much attention has been paid to the elaboration of statistics of larger houses in the study of the *zadruga*. The piling up of large numbers of people in several generations on one peasant or pastoral property is only a hypertrophy of an original, simple aspect, called forth by economic circumstances. The *zadruga*, in general, is nothing more than a fraternity, a unit tied together by common genetic origin, that has preferred not to divide but to manage its property cooperatively.' See Jiriček (1952): 50-1.

more efficient food-producing techniques, such as the pasturing of hogs in oak forests, the acquisition of some capability for growing grain rather than depending exclusively on sheep herding, and the adoption of more efficient crops (such as maize in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries) would enlarge the subsistence base and permit larger households, while economies of scale in the division of labor would encourage their growth. Much of the history of the *zadruga* is a series of responses to changing ecological conditions and to the pressures of taxation, but it is not a simple history, for the external constraints have not always been consistent.

The process itself, within these varying constraints, exhibits great regularity.⁷¹ The household begins with a man and his wife and grows through time until it consists of himself, his wife, and maturing children. As some of the sons marry, they may leave to find new households consisting of only an adult male and his family. They are more likely to remain in the parental household for a time, even if their father dies; certainly the presence of a widowed mother or of immature siblings, particularly sisters, would keep at least some sons on the old homestead. Division of the household seems to be encouraged more by the growth of sons' families than by any other factor, and brothers whose own sons are approaching maturity tend to hive off.⁷² Many of the 551 men without coresident adult males in the 1528 census probably had sons approaching maturity; many of those with one or two adult sons had probably been in a fraternal joint family within the last few years. Only rarely does a household remain together long enough to exhibit any great complexity of kinship ties; fraternal nephews in 1528 were most frequently included when their own father was absent, so that their structural position approximated that of adopted sons.

The structural situation is not much different in modern times, although the constraints have shifted.⁷³ Birth rates are lower, but infant mortality has dropped, so that basic pressures for accretion may not have altered much. Mortality among older persons has lowered, making lineal extension more frequent. Taxation is no longer a matter of feudal dues on a per-household basis; however, government restrictions on the amount of land that can be owned induce formal division but camouflaged cooperation in the same way that medieval law codes induced formal coresidence but clandestine division to avoid labor dues. The increase in personal property has heightened the advantage of early household division, particularly for an energetic man with a small family;

⁷¹ Compare Halpern, below, Chapter 16, pp. 404-405.

⁷² Confirming evidence on the limited kinship span and generational depth of joint households comes from Radjenović, who observed in Bosanska Krajina in 1933-4 that brothers lived together until their sons began to marry. Radjenović (1948): 463.

⁷³ See also Novaković's insightful comment (1891): 234 on just these points. Jiriček (1952): 52, in evaluating the medieval sources, says (my translation): 'If one adds to the men the appropriate number of women and children that are not mentioned, then there is not a great difference in number with respect to modern times.' It is important to note that the range of variation from the fourteenth to the twentieth century is no greater than the range over areas in the present decade.

if he leaves his brothers, taking an equal share, his greater productivity will be divided among fewer consumers. However, there is little difference between this situation and that which obtained when land was free for the taking during the period of the great migrations as the Turkish tide ebbed and flowed. A money economy, it is said, spells disaster for the extended household, but any ethnographer of the Balkans or of other peasant areas can point to the way in which cash income for sons living at home but working in provincial industries has played a critical role in preserving the extended family. It is also claimed that urbanization and the advent of capitalism (or industrial socialism, if I may make that substitution) sound the death-knell of kinship, but Laslett and Clarke's analysis of the Census of Belgrade in 1733 shows large households with many kin, as well as servants, and Benedict⁷⁴ had demonstrated the importance of family connections in the development of commercial networks. Just a casual acquaintance with the world of petty traders will show that it is difficult to find a Lebanese rug merchant who is not working for a cousin.⁷⁵

This is not to say that there have been no changes in the *zadruga* or that it is now as strong as it ever was, but it is clear that the evidence cited for its decline is often seriously defective or superficial. Arguments that the *zadruga* was in the process of unilinear dissolution in the fourteenth century because only 12 % to 46 % of the houses had more than about six members cannot be sustained. That 41 % of the Vlach households of 1528 were nonextended is no better evidence, for any family cycle requires some proportion of smaller units that can become larger ones; even in Metohija today, noted for its unusually large households, 74 % of the units are nonextended.⁷⁶ Evidence for the decline of the *zadruga* as an institution can be found in the increasing *proportion* of nonextended households.⁷⁷ The reasons for that increased proportion are not simple, but if there is a principal factor it is that economic changes now make it relatively easy for a lone male with his wife to make a living in the rural zone or to desert it entirely, while the requirements of frontier life and of mixed farming in earlier times gave a decided advantage to small groups of men living jointly. *The cycle of the zadruga has now shortened* (even though the *people* live longer); sons more frequently leave on or before marriage, or they leave sooner after marriage, but the basic cycle persists, grounded in a continuing agnatic ideology of kinship, although modified by changing external constraints, just as it has always been modified by such shifting external constraints.⁷⁸

If one insists that the historical process be simple, so that different social

⁷⁴ Benedict, *Family firms and economic development* (1968).

⁷⁵ I am indebted to Maurice Freedman for stressing that the effects of industrialization and urbanization (or other similar processes) on *household structure* and on *kinship linkages* and on the functions of either of these, must be kept separate (personal communication). My point here is that industrialization and urbanization do not necessarily weaken either the extended household or the extended family (as a nonresidential group) but may strengthen both. ⁷⁶ Radovanović (1964). ⁷⁷ See Halpern and Anderson (1970).

⁷⁸ See particularly Hammel (1969 i) and (1969 ii) for discussion of the retention of agnatic ideology in Serbian kinship and the effects of ecological change on family and lineage structure.

forms, reified and enshrined, appear as beads on a string according to some single and fundamental orientation, this discussion can only have complicated the issue. If, on the other hand, one insists that the fundamental *principles* of social organization be simple, the discussion has at least illuminated its goal. Cyclical and secular process must not be confused, just as maintenance function and origin must be kept separate; the reasons for the division of individual households may not be the reasons for the decline of the extended household as an institution. The surface structures of social forms are the results of an interplay of conflicting forces on fundamental processes; a social institution is not its end products but rather the procedural rules or principles that generate those products under varying constraints. The purpose of this analysis has been to suggest that, although a multitude of such constraints may operate to alter the decision-making patterns in family life, ranging from changes in ecological relationships through factors of economics and of the political system, to changes in the age at marriage and the authority relationships between spouses, siblings, and children, these constraints operate on a fundamental process of kinship that shows great similarity across time and space.⁷⁹

⁷⁹ Compare Goody, above, Chapter 3, pp. 103–124. Goody stresses the similarities between domestic groups in Asia, Africa and Europe.